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“Please, Draw Me a Field of
Jurisdiction”: Regulating Securities,
Securing Federalism
Jean Leclair*

[L]ittle thought has been given to the possibility that the main problem
in a federal state may no longer be so much how to divide powers over
entire policy fields but how to allocate different tasks within one and
same policy field.
Thomas O. Hueglin

**

I. INTRODUCTION
In Antoine de St-Exupéry’s famous story The Little Prince,1 an aviator makes a crash landing in the middle of the Sahara desert and there
encounters the main character, a child originating from a distant planet.
On first meeting the aviator, without a word of introduction, the Little
Prince asks him bluntly to draw him a sheep. Somewhat disconcerted,
the aviator acquiesces and tries his best to satisfy the child. He pens a
very sketchy silhouette of what he hopes will pass for a sheep. But the
Little Prince is not satisfied: “This one is already quite sick. Make another.” The aviator tries again. Another failure. “[T]hat’s not a sheep, it’s
a ram. It has horns,” says his newfound friend. And again the aviator applies himself at drawing a suitable sheep. However, this time the sheep is
said to be too old. His patience tried, the aviator finally draws a box and
says to the Little Prince: “This is just the crate. The sheep you want is
*
Professor, Faculty of Law, Université de Montréal. I wish to thank François Chevrette,
Fabien Gélinas, Sébastien Gignac, Noura Karazivan, Michel Morin, François Ramsay, François
Roberge, Bruce Ryder, Stéphane Rousseau and Maxime Trottier for their very helpful comments. I
remain, as always, etc., etc.
**
“The Principle of Subsidiarity: Tradition — Practice — Relevance” in Ian Peach, ed.,
Constructing Tomorrow’s Federalism (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 2007), at 202.
1
Translated by Richard Howard (Orlando: Harcourt Inc., 2000). Original version: Le Petit
Prince, collection folio junior (Gallimard, 1946).
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inside.” To his surprise, the child beams with joy and says: “That’s just
the kind I wanted.”
Drawing with precision the breadth of a power over “general regulation of trade”2 under section 91(2) of the Constitution Act, 18673 is a
most daunting task. It is much easier simply to draw a conceptual box
whose contours are so obscure and vague that one can find in it exactly
what he wants when he wants it.
As I will try to demonstrate, notwithstanding that there are good reasons to argue that this power cannot serve as a basis for the recognition
of a federal authority to regulate the securities market, I do believe that
the Supreme Court of Canada will resort to it as a peg on which to hang
the central government’s securities hat.4 The challenge the high court will
then face will be in establishing limits to the reach of such a power. This
article intends to focus on that particular problem.5
As we will see, the case law makes it quite difficult to calibrate the
breadth of a power, once it has been recognized. This is especially so
where the GRT power is invoked. The test designed to delimit this field
of jurisdiction is so abstruse, more so in fact than tests delimiting the extent of other heads of power, that the door is open to results that have
more to do with ideological convictions than with the empirical reality of
the securities market in Canada.
If the federal structure of the Canadian state and, paradoxically, the
divided nature of our common market, are to be taken seriously into account, the challenge then lies in allowing both the central government
and the provinces a legitimate and guaranteed space in the regulation of
2

Hereinafter “GRT”.
(U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5.
4
This paper will not examine whether the “national interest” doctrine founded on Parliament’s residuary power could justify the recognition of a federal authority to regulate the securities
market. Since the said doctrine confers an exclusive and permanent jurisdiction over both the interprovincial and the intraprovincial aspects of a particular matter (Reference re Anti-inflation Act,
[1976] S.C.J. No. 12, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373, at 444 and 461 (S.C.C.); Johannesson v. West Saint-Paul
(Rural Municipality), [1952] S.C.J. No. 3, [1952] 1 S.C.R. 292, at 311-12 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Johannesson”]; R. v. Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd., [1988] S.C.J. No. 23, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 401, at 433
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Crown Zellerbach”]), the federal government is most unlikely to invoke it. In
fact, Peter W. Hogg, lead counsel for the central government in the intended reference to the Supreme Court on the proposed federal Securities Act, always refers to the GRT power as his prime
weapon: see, for example, Kelly Harris, Constitutional Heavyweights Spar Over Single National
Securities Regulator, November 16, 2009, online: <http://www.canadianlawyermag.com/
Constitutional-law-heavyweights-spar-over-single-national-securities-regulator.html.>
5
This paper was written before the release, on May 26, 2010, of the federal government’s
Proposed Canadian Securities Act, online <http://www.fin.gc.ca/drleg-apl/csa-lvm-eng.asp>. Be that
as it may, reference is made to it when necessary.
3
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securities. The recognition of a space for provinces entails the rejection
of constitutional approaches that would make it possible for Parliament
to claim a jurisdiction over the entire field of securities — either directly
by way of an all-encompassing exclusive power over such a matter or
indirectly by way of a limited exclusive power buttressed by an ancillary
power allowing a federal encroachment over provincial spheres of jurisdiction. The only solution, one by the way that stands little chance of
success, would be to confine federal jurisdiction over securities to matters that provinces have proved unable to address, that is, matters having
a strictly interprovincial or international character.
After underlining the fragile empirical basis of many arguments in
favour of a unified federal securities regime (II), I intend to describe how
the division of powers has been judicially apprehended in recent years,
particularly in commercial and economic matters (III). I will then discuss
how our current understanding of such division of powers constitutes a
next to insurmountable obstacle to the preservation of an unassailable
provincial sphere of intervention over securities if, indeed, the Supreme
Court invokes the GRT power as the basis of a valid federal intervention
in that field (IV). Finally, I will examine how a true federal spirit might
inspire a less Manichean approach to the regulation of securities (V).6

II. THE QUESTIONABLE EMPIRICAL BASIS JUSTIFYING THE
ENTHUSIASTIC EMBRACE OF A FEDERAL MONOPOLY OVER
SECURITIES REGULATION
I am not a specialist in matters of securities regulation. Be that as it
may, many informed actors in that field do question the empirical validity of a great number of factual statements forming the basis of
arguments levelled against the present provincial securities regulatory
system.
Although some do recognize advantages to provincial regulation,
most critics of the present system7 essentially emphasize the following
6
On the notion of “federal spirit”, see Jean Leclair, “Forging a True Federal Spirit — Refuting the Myth of Quebec’s ‘Radical Difference’” in André Pratte, ed., Reconquering Canada:
Quebec Federalists Speak Up for Change (Toronto: Douglas & MacIntyre, 2008), at 29-74, online:
<http://hdl.handle.net/1866/2927>.
7
It’s Time, the Wise Persons’ Committee to Review the Structure of Securities Regulation
in Canada (December 2003), online: <http://www.wise-averties.ca/reports/WPC%20Final.pdf>
[hereinafter “The Wise Persons”]; Crawford Panel on a Single Canadian Securities Regulator, Blueprint for a Canadian Securities Commission, Final paper (June 2006), online: <http://www.crawford
panel.ca/Crawford_Panel_final_paper.pdf> [hereinafter “Crawford Panel on a Single Canadian
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three lacunae.8 First, the present structure of regulation based on the
“passport system” is said to be too fragmented, requiring decisions to be
coordinated across up to 13 jurisdictions, thus making it difficult for provincial securities regulators to react quickly and decisively to capital
market events. Second, this system is claimed to be incongruent with the
national response required to address developments in capital markets
that are increasingly national and international in scope. In other words,
it is unable to manage systemic risk. In fact, some critics seem to argue
for a federal jurisdiction not only over securities but also over all financial sector regulators in Canada so as to manage risk in a proactive,
collaborative and effective manner.9 Third, it is claimed that, by misallocating resources — these having to be allocated to 13 separate securities
regulators — the provincial passport system causes securities regulation
to be less efficient and also too costly since redundancy engenders duplication which itself results in unnecessary costs, overstaffing and delays.
Last, some critics appear to be partially fuelled by a possible “race to the
bottom” between provincial jurisdictions.10
In a series of very exhaustive studies, authors such as Cédric Sabbah,
Jean-Marc Suret and Cécile Carpentier, the last two working under the aegis of the Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en analyse des
organisations (“CIRANO”), radically questioned the empirical foundations of the above mentioned criticisms.11 In case anyone should think that
Securities Regulator”]; Crawford Panel on a Single Canadian Securities Regulator, One Year On:
Seeing the Way Forward (June 2007), online: <http://www.crawfordpanel.ca/OneYearOn.pdf>;
Expert Panel on Securities Regulation, Creating an Advantage in Global Capital Markets — Final
Report and Recommendations [hereinafter “Hockin Report”], January 2009, online: <http://www.
expertpanel.ca/eng/reports/index.html>.
8
Hockin Report, id., at 40.
9
Id., at 40 and 49. See also David Laidler, Grasping the Nettles — Clearing the Path to
Financial Services Reform in Canada, C.D. Howe Institute, Commentary, no 238, 2006, online:
<http://www.cdhowe.org/pdf/commentary_238.pdf>.
10
The Wise Persons, supra, note 7, at 49.
11
Jean-Marc Suret & Cécile Carpentier, Canadian Securities Regulation: Issues and Challenges, Burgundy Report, Commission des valeurs mobilières du Québec, 2003RB-06, 2003, online:
<http://www.cirano.qc.ca/pdf/publication/2003RB-06.pdf> [hereinafter “Suret & Carpentier, Canadian Securities Regulation: Issues and Challenges”]; Jean-Marc Suret & Cécile Carpentier,
Securities Regulation in Canada, Commission des valeurs mobilières du Québec, 2003RP-12, 2003,
online: <http://www.cirano.qc.ca/pdf/publication/2003RP-12.pdf> [hereinafter “Suret & Carpentier,
Securities Regulation in Canada”]; Cédric Sabbah, Fédéralisme, concurrence intergouvernementale
et intérêt national dans le domaine des valeurs mobilières au Canada, Faculty of Law, University of
Montreal, LL.M. Thesis, 2006, online: <https://papyrus.bib.umontreal.ca/jspui/bitstream/1866/2383/
1/11741805.pdf> [hereinafter “Sabbah”]; and Cécile Carpentier & Jean-Marc Suret, Proposal for a
Single Securities Commission: Comments and Discussion, 2009RP-05, September 2009, online:
<http://www.cirano.qc.ca/pdf/publication/2009RP-05.pdf> [hereinafter “Carpentier & Suret, Proposal for a Single Securities Commission”]. As for the Autorité des marchés financiers du Québec,
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these authors’ studies are based on a purely “quebecocentrist” perspective,
their work, it must be emphasized, is based upon an “interjurisdictional
competition” theoretical perspective that has generated a vast literature in
the field of economy.12
In a preamble to one of their studies, Suret and Carpentier went so
far as to assert that
Canadian economic and regulatory policy decisions have more often
than not been guided by myths put forward by pressure groups rather
than by actual knowledge resulting from rigorous, independent
research. It is disturbing to realize that some are considering reforming
a system which has not been analyzed carefully, on the basis of
13
assertions made primarily by pressure groups.

Recognizing that ameliorations are certainly possible and that mutual
recognition could not see the light of day without a willingness to harmonize rules, these authors demonstrate, with convincing data, that no
empirical evidence exists proving that the current regulatory structure
disadvantages Canadian issuers14 or that it constitutes an obstacle to the
development of solutions tailored to the financing of growth companies.15 As to costs, the authors underline that
[f]our studies show that the cost of initial offerings is significantly
lower in Canada than in the United States, which does not have
multiple securities commissions. The process for an initial offering is
not only less costly in Canada, it is also more rapid. It is thus difficult
to argue that the existence of several securities authorities in Canada
heavily penalizes the competitiveness of the primary securities market,

its opinion is detailed in an eloquently entitled document: Single Regulator: A Needless Proposal,
Brief Submitted to the Expert Panel on Securities Regulation, July 2008, online: <http://www.
lautorite.qc.ca/publication/intervenants-secteur-financier.en.html>.
12
To name but a few authors referred to in the above mentioned studies: Albert Breton,
Competitive Governments — An Economic Theory of Politics and Public Finance (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996); Daphne A. Kenyon, “Theories of Interjuridictional Competition” (1997) New England Economic Rev. 13-35; Wallace E. Oates, “Environmental Policy in the
European Community: Harmonization or National Standards?” (1998) 25 Empirica 1-13 ; Charles
M. Tiebout, “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditure” (1956) 64 J. of Pol. Ec. 416 and Richard H.K.
Vietor, Contrived Competition: Regulation and Deregulation in America (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1994).
13
Suret & Carpentier, Canadian Securities Regulation: Issues and Challenges, supra, note
11, at 5.
14
Id., at 27.
15
Carpentier & Suret, Proposal for a Single Securities Commission, supra, note 11, at 49.
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especially since in both countries brokerage commissions constitute the
16
greater share of total direct costs.

Furthermore, since centralization is always presented as a panacea,
especially as it could curb the “race to the bottom” between provinces
that regulatory competition is said to generate, Suret and Carpentier
demonstrate that in fact “a race to the top and not to the bottom exists in
the securities field where, traditionally, the most exacting jurisdictions
have attracted a greater number of issuers and investors”.17
Insistence on centralization as the only solution to the problems facing the present regulatory system also presumes that harmonization and
uniformity are always the best paths toward efficiency. First, this posture
minimizes the harmonization efforts already deployed by the Canadian
Securities Administrators since 1997.18 Second and most importantly, it
seems far from evident that perfect harmonization or uniformity may
even be the most desirable paths toward efficiency. Suret and Carpentier
underline, more so than any of the proponents of centralization, the heterogeneous nature of the Canadian securities market, one characterized
by diversity in terms of types of companies and provincial initiatives,19
so much so that, according to these authors, it would be preferable to refer to “a group of markets rather than [to] a single market”.20 Third, to
say the least, empirical evidence concerning the success of the United
16
Suret and Carpentier, Canadian Securities Regulation: Issues and Challenges, supra,
note 11, at 12.
17
Id., at 17. Kathryn Harrison, “Are Canadian Provinces Engaged in a Race to the Bottom?
Evidence and Implications” in Kathryn Harrison, ed., Racing to the Bottom? Provincial Interdependence in the Canadian Federation (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2006), 257) examined empirical
evidence of interprovincial competition, and came to the conclusion that “provinces within the Canadian federation are not completely at the mercy of destructive provincial competition” (at 257) and
that “competition for investment and to avoid benefit claimants has not decimated the provinces’
capacity to govern” (at 269). The author stressed, however, that “it is premature to lay to rest the
prospect of races to the bottom in the Canadian federation” (at 269).
18
Securities regulators exist in each of the 10 provinces and three territories in Canada. All
these associated themselves to form the Canadian Securities Administrators. The latter has the mandate of protecting Canadian investors and the general public.
19
Suret & Carpentier, Securities Regulation in Canada, supra, note 11, at 68:
Diversity of the Canadian securities market is revealed by the characteristics of companies on one hand and provincial initiatives on the other. Small western businesses have
little in common with those at the heart of the Ontario economy, which are also different
from medium-sized businesses central to the Quebec economy. Moreover, independence
with respect to securities has been used by various provinces to initiate programs meeting
the needs of their respective customers — companies and investors.
20
Suret and Carpentier, Canadian Securities Regulation: Issues and Challenges, supra,
note 11, at 15 and 17-18; and Suret & Carpentier, Securities Regulation in Canada, supra, note 11,
at 68-73.
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States’21 or Australia’s22 system, does not convincingly establish the superiority of national securities commissions.
I might add that the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and
Development (“OECD”) has ranked Canada’s securities regulatory system as the second best in the developed world, just after New Zealand,
and ahead of the United States’ and the United Kingdom’s centralized
systems.23
Having thus shaken the empirical foundations of many arguments in
favour of centralization, the abovementioned authors engage in a critical
analysis of the strengths of the present system. For instance, the latter
allows for multiple experimentations whereas a national system is structurally limited to one experience at a time.24 This diversity of
experimentation limits the costs of failure to one single jurisdiction and
not to the whole country.25 A decentralized system is more responsive
21
In the conclusion of one of their studies, Suret & Carpentier, Proposal for a Single Securities Commission, supra, note 11, at 49 state that, in Canada,
[t]he direct costs of offerings are lower than those in the United States for offerings of the
same size, time frames are shorter than those in the United States and, in particular, the
cost of financing for small issuers, measured by the returns earned by investors, is favourable to issuers. These market characteristics provide issuers with a considerably
higher life expectancy at the time of an offering than that observed for offerings by more
mature companies in other countries, including the United States. Improvements are certainly possible, but it is difficult to argue that the existing regulatory structure has been an
obstacle to the development of solutions tailored to the financing of growth companies.
The experts mandated by the Panel [Crawford Panel on a Single Canadian Securities
Regulator, supra, note 7] emphasized the importance of taking steps to reduce the cost of
corporate financing. We have shown that, in general, this cost is identical to that in the
United States. For issuers, it seems abnormally favourable, especially in the case of
growth companies.
See also Sabbah, supra, note 11, at 49-50.
22
Suret & Carpentier, Securities Regulation in Canada, supra, note 11, at 6, 14, 37 and 53;
Carpentier & Suret, Proposal for a Single Securities Commission, supra, note 11, at 13 and 47; and
Sabbah, supra, note 11, at 9-10, 18-20 and 50.
23
Economic Policy Reforms Going for Growth, 2006, Organisation for Economic CoOperation and Development, 2006, at 126. The document mentions (id., at 127) that this ranking was
based on the following detailed empirical study: Alain De Serres, et al., “Regulation of Financial
Systems and Economic Growth” (August 2006). OECD Working Paper No. 506. Available online:
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=965693>. However, in a more recent document (Economic Survey of
Canada, 2008, Policy Brief, OECD, June 2008 at 4 — <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/20/27/
40811541.pdf> it is stated that “[t]he current diversity of regulations [in Canada] — for example,
each province has its own securities regulator — makes it difficult to maximise efficiency, and increases the risk that firms will choose to issue securities in other countries. A single regulator would
eliminate the inefficiencies created by the limited enforcement authority of individual provincial
agencies.” (emphasis in original) Then again, it must be underlined that, contrary to the conclusions
of the 2006 document that were based on extensive empirical data, not a shred of evidence is provided to buttress this claim.
24
Sabbah, supra, note 11, at 41 and 45.
25
Id., at 41.
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than a national one to problems that only affect subgroups of the national
industry.26 A national system might not be as sensitive as a decentralized
one to local sensibilities.27 Furthermore, since an important objective of
securities regulation is investor protection, and since it must be acknowledged that investors are always situated “somewhere” in one province or
another, hence, it must be admitted that investigations and enforcement
of breaches to securities regulation always involve a local dimension. It
can therefore be argued that investor protection through enforcement can
be better served by provincial regulators who act in an institutional and
cultural environment they are more familiar with.28 And even though
some proposals advocate a federal “model includ[ing] a local presence
through regional and district offices”,29 the very structure of a national
system requires that compromises be devised, compromises that are
bound to ignore the more local voices.30
Finally, a national securities commission might fall prey to “regulatory capture”, that is, a situation where a regulatory agency, instead of
acting in the public interest, acts in favour of the dominant commercial
interests in the very industry it is called upon to regulate.31 Centralizing
the regulation of securities markets removes an effective check on this
risk, this check being regulatory competition.32 The risk of “regulatory
capture” cannot be dismissed lightly given the high concentration of the
financial industry in Canada, with the large banks controlling the major
investment dealers firms.33 Indeed, capture of the regulatory process is
more probable where concentration is high.34 Provincial regulatory agencies are not immune to such capture, but monopolizing the attention of
each and every one of the 13 provincial and territorial securities commissions is less likely to happen.35
26

Id., at 46.
Id., at 47-48.
28
The previous two sentences were penned by my colleague Stéphane Rousseau. Professor
Rousseau is a securities law specialist. Not being able to call mine the modifications he so generously proposed after reading my manuscript, I therefore decided to insert them in my paper with a
clear identification of their origin.
29
The Wise Persons, supra, note 7, at 68 and Hockin Report, supra, note 7, at 47.
30
Sabbah, supra, note 11, at 47-48.
31
Jean-Marc Suret & Cécile Carpentier, “The Canadian and American Financial Systems:
Competition and Regulation” (2003) 29 Canadian Public Policy 431.
32
This sentence and the following two sentences were penned by my colleague Stéphane
Rousseau.
33
For a similar preoccupation, see Jean-Marc Suret and Cécile Carpentier, supra, note 11.
34
Gary Becker, “A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence”
(1983) 98 Quart. J. Econ. 371.
35
Sabbah, supra, note 11, at 49.
27
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A look at the evolution of securities legislation in Canada since the beginning of the 20th century also shows the deep involvement of provinces
in securities regulation. More particularly, such evolution demonstrates
that provinces have experimented with different regulatory approaches.36
In 1912, Manitoba enacted the first Blue Sky law, inspired by the regulatory approach put forth by Kansas in the United States.37 Pursuant to the
Blue Sky model, in order to protect investors, the governmental authority
had control over share issues. While a number of provinces followed
Manitoba,38 other provinces experimented with other techniques. Ontario,
for instance, followed another path with the Security Frauds Prevention
Act,39 which established a registration regime backed by sanction provisions for fraud. Quebec preferred to rely on a disclosure model and only
later integrated anti-fraud provisions.40
After the market crash of 1929, the United States undertook a fundamental reform of its regulatory regimes. Following an in-depth study
of the securities market, Congress enacted the Securities Act of 1933 and
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.41 The thrust of the reform was
to move away from the paternalistic Blue-Sky laws to a disclosure-based
model. The United States reforms prompted Canadian provinces to explore new avenues to regulate the securities markets. Ontario took the
lead in following the United States model. Later, in the 1960s, with the
publication of the Kimber Report,42 Ontario set the foundations of “modern” securities legislation with a model that was widely followed across
provinces afterwards.
In the 1970s, acting within the Canadian Securities Administrators,
provincial securities commissions increasingly focused on harmonization. The strong push toward harmonization eventually led to the
Passport initiative. Despite the fact that securities regulation is nowadays
36

See generally J. Peter Williamson, Securities Legislation in Canada (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 1960).
37
Sale of Shares Act, S.M. 1912, c. 75. See Paul G. Mahoney, “The Origins of the Blue Sky
Laws: A Test of Competing Hypotheses” (2003) 46 J. Law & Econ. 229.
38
Christopher Armstrong, Blue Skies and Boiler Rooms: Buying and Selling Securities
in Canada, 1870-1940 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), at 66-72. See also Tara
Gray & Andrew Kitching, Reforming Canadian Securities Regulation, Parliamentary Information
and Research Service, PRB 05-28E, 2005, at 2, online: <http://www2.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/
ResearchPublications/prb0528-e.pdf>.
39
S.O. 1928, c. 34.
40
This paragraph and the following three paragraphs were penned by Stéphane Rousseau.
41
Louis Loss & Joel Seligman, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation, 5th ed. (Aspen Publishers, 2004), at 1.
42
Report of the Attorney General’s Committee on Securities Legislation in Ontario (Toronto: Queen’s Printer, 1965).
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highly harmonized at the pan-Canadian level, particularities remain in
provincial statutes, some of which are the product of innovations stemming from local initiatives. While these particularities can be seen as
technical, they reflect the contributions that Alberta, British Columbia
and Quebec have made over decades of regulation and that are now encapsulated in the harmonized framework. For instance, Quebec acted as a
leader with respect to the regulation of various dimensions of financial
intermediaries, such as ownership, capital structure and activities. Indeed, Quebec was at the forefront of the decompartmentalization of
financial institutions in the 1980s.43 This prompted the enactment of an
original regulatory framework in Quebec concerning financial intermediaries.44
A contemporary example of the role of diversity in securities regulation is found in the “Canadian response” to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.45, 46
Adopted in 2002 in the wake of the wave of corporate scandals that hit
the United States, SOX introduced stringent requirements to restore investor confidence. Despite its sound objective, SOX was criticized for
imposing undue costs on issuers. In Canada, the Canadian Securities
Administrators debated whether or not to implement SOX-like reforms
north of the border. The debates centred on whether SOX should be “cut
and pasted” in Canada or whether it should be adapted to the Canadian
context. Ultimately, adaptation was favoured. The Canadian Securities
Administrators adopted regulation that imposed additional corporate governance requirements tailored to the particularities of Canadian issuers.
From the foregoing, it follows that provinces are certainly not incapable of regulating securities. Nevertheless, proponents of decentralization
do recognize a legitimate role for Parliament in the field of securities regulation. Cédric Sabbah,47 for instance, argues for recognition of federal
power only where provinces are constitutionally unable to intervene or
where a truly national public interest is at stake. In other words, recognition of federal authority would hinge upon proof being made that federal
43
On the transformation of financial institutions, see Christopher C. Nicholls, Financial Institutions — The Regulatory Framework (Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada, 2008).
44
See Act respecting the distribution of financial products and services, R.S.Q., c. D-9.2
adopted in 1998.
45
An Act to protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws, and for other purposes [hereinafter “SOX”].
46
See Christopher C. Nicholls, “The Characteristics of Canada’s Capital Markets and the Illustrative Case of Canada’s Legislative Regulatory Response to Sarbanes-Oxley” in Task Force to
Modernize Securities Legislation in Canada, Canada Steps Up, vol. 4 — Maintaining a Competitive
Capital Market in Canada (Toronto, 2006), at 127.
47
Sabbah, supra, note 11, at 108-16 and 153-56.
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intervention constitutes a plus-value and not simply a means of providing
uniformity of regulation just for the sake of uniformity.
According to that logic, Sabbah argues for a complementary federalprovincial regulation model. Provinces would remain competent as regards the protection of investors and public protection, while Parliament
would be endowed with the power to regulate matters having crossborder, i.e., extraprovincial aspects. That category would comprise matters such as the regulation of stock exchanges, hub of all sorts of
interprovincial and international transactions. Representation of Canada
in international forums and authority to negotiate international agreements would also fall in the federal lap. Finally, Sabbah argues for a
federal power to establish minimal standards that provinces would have
to integrate to their own sets of rules so as to prevent the dreaded “race to
the bottom” and also, more importantly, because Ottawa is the only level
of government that can legitimately claim a right to determine where the
national public interest lies — the public interest being the guiding principle of all 13 securities regulators.48
Sabbah insists that to capitalize on the advantages of both provincial
securities specialization and interprovincial competition, a market participant should be allowed to choose a primary jurisdiction of his or her
choice.49 But for this choice to be abided by, the participant’s province of
48

Id., at 23-28, 108 and 119.
Id., at 89-90, 96-108 and 137-39. Presently, s. 1.1 of the Provincial/Territorial Memorandum of Understanding Regarding Securities Regulation, online: <http://www.securitiescanada.
org/2004_0930_mou_english.pdf> defines the “primary jurisdiction” as the province or territory to
which a market participant is considered to be most closely connected for the purposes of the measures contemplated in the Memorandum. In most circumstances this will correspond
i) for an individual registrant, the jurisdiction in which the individual’s normal working
office is located;
ii) for a registrant that is not an individual, the jurisdiction in which the registrant’s head
office is located;
iii) for an issuer, the jurisdiction in which the issuer’s head office is located.
Section 5.1 of the Memorandum specifies that the
passport system for securities regulation will provide a single window of access to market
participants. This could be done through mutual recognition, legal delegation, or a combination of these approaches, as one approach may work best in certain areas of
regulation but be less than optimal in other areas.
Under mutual recognition, participating jurisdictions would recognize that a market
participant who complies with, files documents under and/or receives approvals respecting market access requirements of the primary jurisdiction, is deemed to be in compliance
with or exempt from the market access compliance, document filing and/or approval requirements of its host jurisdiction(s).
Under legal delegation, participating jurisdictions would delegate powers to make
decisions to the primary jurisdiction.
49
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origin would then have to ensure that the selected regulatory regime be
applicable within the limits of its own territory. Although, in my view,
the constitutional validity of such a “referential legislation” scheme is not
to be doubted, I believe that resort may be had to a complementary federal legislation ensuring the extraprovincial application of provincial
regulation. If the central government is competent over the interprovincial aspects of securities and over extraterritorial issues,50 it can most
certainly incorporate by reference legal rules it might have adopted itself.
Finally, it is trite law that federal legislation can apply only in one or in
some provinces.51
Whether or not Sabbah’s proposition should be followed to the letter
is a question that falls to be answered by securities experts. However it
does illustrate that, if serious consideration is given to the empirical reality of the securities environment in Canada, an unavoidable conclusion
imposes itself: it is far from self-evident that federal uniformity and exclusivity of regulation would necessarily lead to greater efficiency.
Therefore, when in doubt, and especially so in a federal state, the prudent
approach, it seems to me, would be for courts to recoil from any federal
demand for exclusive control of the securities markets.
Be that as it may, as I will now try to demonstrate, the dice appear
loaded against any attempt at limiting federal jurisdiction over both the
intra-and extraprovincial aspects of securities regulation. To recognize a
federal power of such extent, the Supreme Court need not think out of
the box. To paraphrase the aviator in Saint-Exupéry’s tale, “GRT is a
crate. The power Ottawa wants is inside.”
After briefly describing how the division of powers has been judicially apprehended in recent years, particularly in commercial and
economic matters (III), I will try to describe how difficult a task it will be
for provinces to convince the Supreme Court of the necessity of preserving an unassailable provincial sphere of intervention over securities if,
indeed, the latter tribunal invokes the GRT power as the basis of a valid
federal intervention in that field (IV).

50

Hunt v. T&N plc, [1993] S.C.J. No. 125, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 289 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Hunt”] and Reference re Upper Churchill Water Rights Reversion Act, 1980 (Newfoundland),
[1984] S.C.J. No. 16, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 297 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Reference re Upper Churchill”].
51
Canadian Egg Marketing Agency v. Richardson, [1998] S.C.J. No. 78, [1998] 3 S.C.R.
157, at para. 61 (S.C.C.).
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III. THE “GENERAL REGULATION OF TRADE POWER”: SETTING THE
TABLE FOR FEDERAL SECURITIES LEGISLATION
Since the 1960s, the federal government — liberal or conservative —
has always nurtured a desire to invest the field of securities regulation.
The Harper government, although apparently ready to disengage Ottawa
from the Canadian social union, shows an uncanny earnestness in promoting a strong economic union. Although the wish to ingratiate itself
with Ontario voters is most certainly part of the equation, I surmise that
the present government’s intent, as it was of those who preceded it, is to
further enhance the power and legitimacy of the central government to
regulate the economy in general.
Parliament’s enumerated powers are, for the most part, “electorally
unattractive”. Interprovincial transportation, communications and national defence might have had some appeal in 1867, but with the advent
of the welfare state, health, social welfare and education have become
the politicians’ preferred fields of battle. The sorrowful nature — if I may
be allowed this expression — of the central government’s enumerated
heads of power explains the enthusiastic recourse to the spending power
witnessed during the 1960s through the 1980s and beyond. However, in
view of the spending power’s dubious constitutionality in the eyes of
many, the central government has tried, quite legitimately, to find ways
of expanding its existing legislative powers.52
After enjoying some success with its residuary power, both in its
“emergency”53 and “national interest”54 dimensions, the federal government was faced with the Supreme Court’s dwindling enthusiasm towards
this potentially federation-destroying power.55 Nevertheless, as it was
closing the door on the national interest doctrine, the Supreme Court was
at the same time opening wide the window of the criminal law power.
“The purpose of the criminal law [it was said] is to underline and protect
our fundamental values.”56 Thus inflated, the criminal law power allowed
52
For a thorough study of this question, see Jean Leclair, “The Supreme Court’s Understanding of Federalism: Efficiency at the Expense of Diversity” (2003) 28 Queen’s L.J. 411, online:
<http://hdl.handle.net/1866/1431> [hereinafter “Leclair, ‘The Supreme Court’s Understanding’”].
53
Reference re Anti-Inflation Act, supra, note 4.
54
Crown Zellerbach, supra, note 4.
55
See La Forest J.’s comment in R. v. Hydro-Québec, [1997] S.C.J. No. 76, [1997] 3
S.C.R. 213, at para. 116 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hydro-Québec”]. See Jean Leclair, “The Elusive
Quest for the Quintessential ‘National Interest’” (2005) 38 U.B.C. L. Rev. 355.
56
Hydro-Québec, id., at paras. 127 and 154. See Jean Leclair, “The Supreme Court, the Environment, and the Construction of National Identity” (1998) 4 Revue d’études constitutionnelles/
Review of Constitutional Studies 372.
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for interventions in the fields of health protection57 and environment protection.58
Although open, the door was not unhinged. Indeed, the “dangerous
character” of an activity, a person or an object, operates as an intrinsic
limit to the criminal law power. Absent such danger, the application of
the criminal law power cannot be triggered. Justice La Forest, in HydroQuébec, took time to point out that, contrary to the national interest doctrine, the criminal law power did not assign “full power to regulate an
area to Parliament. … Rather it seeks by discrete prohibitions to prevent
evils falling within a broad purpose, such as, for example, the protection
of health.”59 Furthermore, unlike the national interest doctrine,60 the
criminal law power does not confer on Parliament an exclusive and permanent jurisdiction over both the interprovincial and the intraprovincial
aspects of a particular matter. Therefore, a widened criminal law power
does not prevent the working of the double aspect doctrine.61
The residuary power and the criminal law power, however broadly
they have been interpreted, cannot be successfully mobilized to allow for
Parliament to regulate the economy. Another field of jurisdiction must be
sought.
Of the many federal enumerated powers endowing Parliament with
authority to regulate the economy,62 the most encompassing is the federal
trade and commerce power (section 91(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867).
Prior to 1989, this field of jurisdiction had been interpreted as conferring
on Parliament the exclusive power to regulate interprovincial and international commerce and to regulate intraprovincial transactions only to
the extent that it was necessarily incidental to the effective regulation of
interprovincial and international trade.63 Although this incidental power
did exist, it has not been invoked frequently by the Courts to justify fed57

RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] S.C.J. No. 68, [1995] 3
S.C.R. 199, at para. 69 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “RJR-MacDonald”]: “Health underlies many of our
most cherished rights and values, and the protection of public health is one of the fundamental responsibilities of Parliament.”
58
Hydro-Québec, supra, note 55. See Jean Leclair, “Aperçu des virtualités de la compétence fédérale en matière de droit criminel dans le contexte de la protection de l’environnement”
(1996) 27 Revue générale de droit 137.
59
Id., at para. 128.
60
Reference re Anti-Inflation Act, supra, note 4, at 444 and 461; Johannesson, supra, note 4
at 311-12; Crown Zellerbach, supra, note 4, at 433.
61
Hydro-Québec, supra, note 55, at para. 131.
62
For a description of the Supreme Court’s liberal interpretation of Parliament’s powers
over the economy, see Leclair, “The Supreme Court’s Understanding”, supra, note 52, at 421-30.
63
Caloil Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1970] S.C.J. No. 91, [1971] S.C.R. 543
(S.C.C.) and R. v. Klassen, [1959] M.J. No. 63, 20 D.L.R. (2d) 406 (Man. C.A.).
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eral encroachments on the provinces’ jurisdiction over intraprovincial
commerce.64
All this changed in 1989 with the General Motors of Canada Ltd. v.
City National Leasing Ltd. decision.65 In that case, building upon an earlier judicial gloss66 on a very laconic statement made by the Privy
Council more than 100 years before,67 a unanimous Court recognized
Parliament’s power over the regulation of “general trade and commerce
affecting Canada as a whole”.68 This new power enabled Parliament, under certain conditions, to adopt legislation “concerned with trade as a
whole rather than with a particular industry”.69 What it conferred on the
central government was jurisdiction over both the interprovincial and the
intraprovincial aspects of trade.70 Thus, in City National Leasing, a federal law regulating competition was held to be intra vires even though it
encroached upon the provinces’ jurisdiction over intraprovincial competition.
However, just like the criminal law power, the GRT power does not
impair the workings of the double aspect doctrine: GRT constitutes the
exclusive power; the matter that falls under that head does not.71
The five criteria devised by Dickson C.J.C. in City National Leasing
to determine whether a matter falls under GRT were summed up as follows in Kirkbi AG v. Ritvik Holdings Inc.:

64
This led Dickson J., as he then was, to note that, even though there is always a “ … possibility for a [provincial] scheme to affect incidentally inter-provincial trade, so long as the scheme is
not in pith and substance in relation to interprovincial trade. This last proposition, while obvious in
other areas of constitutional law, was remarkably absent in the cases respecting trade and commerce
decided in the first half of this century.”: Canadian Industrial Gas & Oil Ltd. v. Saskatchewan,
[1977] S.C.J. No. 124, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 545, at 603 (S.C.C.) (Dickson J. was writing in dissent but
not on this particular point).
65
[1989] S.C.J. No. 28, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 641 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “City National Leasing”].
66
Cheif Justice Laskin’s obiter in MacDonald v. Vapor Canada Ltd., [1976] S.C.J. No. 60,
[1977] 2 S.C.R. 134, at 156-65 (S.C.C.) and the dissenting opinion of Dickson J. in Canada (Attorney General) v. Canadian National Transportation, Ltd., [1983] S.C.J. No. 73, [1983] 2 S.C.R. 206,
at 267-68 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Canadian National Transportation”].
67
In Citizen’s Insurance Co. of Canada v. Parsons (1881), 7 App. Cas. 96, 113 (P.C.)
[hereinafter “Parsons”], Sir Montague Smith recognized that s. 91(2) conferred on Parliament a
power over interprovincial and international trade regulation, but also over the “general regulation of
trade affecting the whole dominion”.
68
City National Leasing, supra, note 65, at 657.
69
Id., at 661.
70
Id., at 680-81.
71
Id., at 682: “ … competition is not a single matter, any more than inflation or pollution.
The provinces too, may deal with competition in the exercise of their legislative powers in such
fields as consumer protection, labour relations, marketing and the like. The point is, however, that
Parliament also has the constitutional power to regulate intraprovincial aspects of competition.”
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(i) the impugned legislation must be part of a regulatory scheme; (ii)
the scheme must be monitored by the continuing oversight of a
regulatory agency; (iii) the legislation must be concerned with trade as
a whole rather than with a particular industry; (iv) the legislation should
be of a nature that provinces jointly or severally would be
constitutionally incapable of enacting; and (v) the failure to include one
or more provinces or localities in a legislative scheme would jeopardize
the successful operation of the scheme in other parts of the country …
These factors are not exhaustive and, to be valid, it is not necessary for
72
federal legislation to satisfy all five criteria.

The difficulties raised by these criteria will be addressed below. For
the time being, I wish only to underline how uncannily appropriate this
test appears to be for recognizing a federal power over securities.
My belief, even though I have no evidence to buttress this claim, is
that Dickson J. (as he then was) had both competition and securities
regulation in mind when he wrote his dissenting opinion in Canadian
National Transportation. A year earlier, in Multiple Access Ltd. v.
McCutcheon,73 he had taken great pains to underline, in obiter, that in
acknowledging a provincial power over securities he was not to be understood as denying “the constitutional right of Parliament to enact a
general scheme of securities legislation pursuant to its power to make
laws in relation to interprovincial and export trade and commerce”.74 And

72

[2005] S.C.J. No. 66, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 302, 2005 SCC 65, at para. 17 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter

“Kirkbi”].
73

[1982] S.C.J. No. 66, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 161 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Multiple Access Ltd.”].
Id., at 173-74:
Parliament has not yet enacted any comprehensive scheme of securities legislation. To
date the Canadian experience has been that the provinces have taken control of the marketing of securities, differing in this respect from the United States where the Securities
and Exchange Commission has regulated trading and primary distribution of securities. I
should not wish by anything said in this case to affect prejudicially the constitutional
right of Parliament to enact a general scheme of securities legislation pursuant to its
power to make laws in relation to interprovincial and export trade and commerce. This is
of particular significance considering the interprovincial and indeed international character of the securities industry. The federal government, it may be noted, has already
produced Proposals for a Securities Market Law for Canada (1979). Professor Anisman,
writing in 1981 in respect of those proposals expressed the view that:
… the factors that indicated a need for federal regulatory involvement in the securities
market in 1979 are still present and, if anything, have been reinforced by events during
the past two years. The Proposals are premised ultimately on the national and international character of the Canadian securities market and its importance to the economic
welfare of the country. The fact that the market is national in scope has long been acknowledged and is demonstrated by the cooperative efforts of the provincial
commissions with respect to the adoption of national policies and by the statutory au74
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even though he acknowledged that, since the 1932 Lymburn v. Mayland75
case, courts had systematically given wide constitutional recognition to
provincial securities regulations, he nonetheless quoted with approval76
the following excerpt from Philip Anisman’s and Peter W. Hogg’s 1979
study entitled “Constitutional Aspects of Federal Securities Legislation”:
The reluctance of the courts to strike down provincial securities
legislation likely stems in part from the fact that there is no federal
securities law so that a declaration of the invalidity of a provincial act
or any of its provisions would create a potential gap in the existing
77
regulatory scheme that might be exploited by the unscrupulous.

In City National Leasing itself, Dickson C.J.C. again referred to this
same study, not once but twice.78 He did not then emit any opinion as to
the constitutional validity of hypothetical federal securities legislation.
Nevertheless, his reading of Professors Anisman’s and Hogg’s paper establishes beyond doubt that he was aware of the potentialities of section
91(2) as a basis for federal intervention in the field of securities.
Finally, in the recent Global Securities Corp. v. British Columbia
(Securities Commission),79 while giving an expansive interpretation to
the province’s power over the securities market, the Supreme Court again
went out of its way to stress that, though it “decline[d] to comment on
the constitutionality of hypothetical overlapping federal legislation”, it
thorization for and increasing frequency of joint hearings held by a number of provincial commissions to decide issues that transcend provincial boundaries.
Justice Estey, dissenting on another issue, shared a similar point of view (at 225):
Counsel for the Attorney General for Canada did not wish to found the validity of these
sections upon an independent claim that, by reason of the potential extra-provincial nature of securities trading, they could be sustained by the authority of s. 91(2) alone. I
venture to say that there will be more and more challenges in the future to the dominant
position now occupied by the securities exchange authorities of the province in which the
major stock exchange of the country is located. As the magnitude and number of multiprovincial security transactions increase the strain on the present unbalanced regulatory
system will mount. It remains to be seen whether this will precipitate a change in the national appreciation of constitutional requirements and federal legislative policy. Until
such a development occurs the disposition of this appeal must be found in the light of the
positions herein taken by the parties. These reasons therefore reflect only the record as
advanced by the proponents and opponents of the traditional arguments on the constitutional nature of corporate and securities legislation.
75
[1932] J.C.J. No. 2, [1932] A.C. 318 (P.C.) [hereinafter “Lymburn”].
76
Multiple Access Ltd., supra, note 73, at 183.
77
Philip Anisman et al., Proposals for a Securities Market Law for Canada, vol. 3 (Ottawa:
Consumer and Corporate Affairs Canada, 1979).
78
City National Leasing, supra, note 65, at 673-74 and 686.
79
[2000] S.C.J. No. 5, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 494 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Global Securities
Corp.”].
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had, in Multiple Access Ltd., “already upheld aspects of federal securities
regulation … under the ‘double aspect’ theory”.80
Therefore, at first glance, it seems most probable that, enticed by Peter W. Hogg’s eloquence and charming accent, the Supreme Court will
do what it does best, i.e., quote and concur with Peter W. Hogg. And if a
federal jurisdiction over securities is found to exist on the basis of the
GRT power, then nothing will be able to stop Parliament from regulating
both the intra- and extraprovincial aspects of this subject matter. However, before moving on to the examination of that particular facet of the
issue, the following caveat must be made.
As I said in the introduction, this article is based on the presumption
that the Supreme Court of Canada will resort to the GRT power as a
means of providing the central government with authority to regulate the
securities market. My intent therefore is to examine whether or not there
exists, under the present state of Canadian constitutional law, a means by
which the federal government could be prevented from entirely ousting
the provinces from this field. However, before pursuing this tack, it must
be confessed that my presumption might not materialize, i.e., the Supreme Court might not recognize the GRT power as a valid ground for a
proposed federal Securities Act.
Such a conclusion could flow from the inability of the recently proposed federal legislation to satisfy the fifth criterion enunciated in City
National Leasing: “the failure to include one or more provinces or localities in a legislative scheme would jeopardize the successful operation of
the scheme in other parts of the country”.81 Now, as it presently stands,
the Proposed Canadian Securities Act82 released on May 26, 2010 indicates, in its preamble, that “Parliament intends to create a single
Canadian securities regulator” and, more importantly for our purpose, it
states that Parliament “chooses to do so through a process under which
80
Id., at para. 46:
The Attorney General of Canada intervened in this appeal to argue that: “if the provision
in question is held to be within provincial jurisdiction, this decision would not preclude
overlapping federal jurisdiction over securities matters in respect of international and interprovincial transactions and co-operation, or any other relevant head of federal
jurisdiction.” Since the central question presented by this appeal is the power of the province to enact s. 141(1)(b), I decline to comment on the constitutionality of hypothetical
overlapping federal legislation. I would note, however, that this Court has already upheld
aspects of federal securities regulation, in another context, in Multiple Access, supra, under the “double aspect” theory. The Court’s decision in the present appeal should not be
taken in any way to question the holding of that case.
81
City National Leasing, supra, note 65, at 662 and Kirkbi, supra, note 72, at para. 17.
82
Supra, note 5.
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the regime will apply as willing provinces and territories opt in”. Sections 250 (1) and (2) prescribe as follows:
250 (1) Subject to sections 251 and 252, sections 1 to 10 and Parts
1 to 14 do not apply in a province unless it is designated under subsection (2).
(2) After receiving the written consent of the Lieutenant Governor
in Council of a province and on the recommendation of the Minister,
the Governor in Council may, by order, designate the province as a
participating province.

In other words, unless the written consent of a province’s political
authorities is given, the bulk of the proposed federal legislation will not
apply in that province. As a consequence, according to the federal government itself, the effectiveness of its legislative scheme does not require
the participation of all provinces. If that is so, how then can it be argued
that “the failure to include one or more provinces or localities in [the]
legislative scheme [will] jeopardize the successful operation of the
scheme in other parts of the country”? Ironically, in trying not to alienate
the provinces by providing for an opting-in procedure instead of imposing a full-blown uniform regulatory system, the federal authorities may
have committed constitutional harakiri.
It remains to be seen, however, whether the Supreme Court will
downplay this fifth criterion by calling to mind its cautionary remark
enunciated in City National Leasing, according to which “[t]hese indicia
do not, however, represent an exhaustive list of traits that will tend to
characterize general trade and commerce legislation. Nor is the presence
or absence of any of these five criteria necessarily determinative.”83
Closing this parenthesis, let us presume then that the Supreme Court
of Canada will indeed resort to the GRT power as a means of providing
the central government with authority to regulate the securities market,
and let us examine whether or not there exists, under the present state of
Canadian constitutional law, a means by which the federal government
could be prevented from entirely ousting the provinces from this field.

83
Supra, note 65, at 662-63. In Kirkbi, supra, note 72, at para. 17, the Court states that
“[t]hese factors are not exhaustive and, to be valid, it is not necessary for federal legislation to satisfy
all five criteria.”
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IV. THE OBSTACLES TO THE PRESERVATION OF AN
UNASSAILABLE PROVINCIAL SPHERE OF INTERVENTION
OVER SECURITIES
If an efficient securities market requires the presence of both levels
of government, how can one make sure that the federal government will
not entirely expel the provinces from this field? What kind of constitutional barriers could be erected around Parliament’s GRT power? Not
many, I fear.
Before examining some possible avenues, let us look at how the present structure of the Supreme Court’s understanding of the constitutional
division of powers makes it difficult to envisage a complementary federal-provincial approach to the regulation of securities.
First of all, to limit the extent of Parliament’s power over GRT, one
must attack the very definition given to the power84 because, once a
power is recognized as allowing Parliament to intervene at both the intraand extraprovincial levels, courts are prohibited from scrutinizing the
manner in which that power is exercised. In a sense, the division of powers is an “all of nothing” game. A level of government either has a power
to regulate (directly through one of its exclusive heads of jurisdiction or
indirectly by way of its ancillary power) or it does not. Once recognized,
the exercise of such a power cannot be modulated according to the
wishes of the courts.
If, for instance, the Supreme Court recognizes the existence of a national emergency, it will serve no purpose to argue that the proposed
federal remedy will be inefficient.85 If, for example, Parliament is said to
be authorized to regulate the sale of young hooded seals under its fisheries jurisdiction,86 or the licensing and registration of ordinary firearms
under its criminal law power,87 the Court will refuse to hear arguments
based on extrinsic evidence to the effect that the federal legislation
should have been better designed,88 that the federal government should
have engaged in more consultation with the provinces prior to its

84

This will be the subject of section V, infra.
Reference re Anti-Inflation Act, supra, note 4, at 468.
86
Ward v. Canada (Attorney General), [2002] S.C.J. No. 21, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 569, 2002
SCC 17 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ward”].
87
Reference re Firearms Act (Can.), [2000] S.C.J. No. 31, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 783 (S.C.C.).
88
Id., at para. 56.
85
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enactment,89 that the law will not be effective,90 that it is inappropriate or
undesirable from a social or economic perspective,91 that its implementation will be too expensive,92 or that the government failed to employ the
best means to achieve its purpose.93
There is, however, one exception to the rule that extrinsic evidence
cannot be invoked to sustain the validity of legislation. In City National
Leasing, the Supreme Court revisited the ancillary power doctrine, that
is, the power recognized to both levels of government to legislate in
ways that may incidentally affect the other government’s spheres of
power. Chief Justice Dickson stated that, in determining whether or not
an impugned provision is valid, one must focus on its connection to or
relationship with valid legislation.94 This connection is assessed by establishing “how well the provision is integrated into the scheme of the
legislation and how important it is for the efficacy of the legislation”.95
Measuring such efficacy should therefore justify resorting to empirical
evidence. I say “should” because, in that case, Dickson C.J.C. confirmed
the validity of the impugned provision without going outside of the legislation itself. He found the private right of action to be “a core provision”
of the Combines Investigation Act because it served to reinforce other
sanctions of the Act; it was intimately linked to the Act and could only be
understood by reference to other provisions of the Act and had no independent content. Finally, the impugned provision provided a private
remedy only for particular violations of the Act and did not create a private right of action at large.96
The Court has also rejected arguments claiming that a federal legislation trenched on provincial powers in a manner that risked upsetting the
balance of federalism. Indeed, as the Court was quick to answer, once
found to be valid, a law cannot be said to upset the balance of federal89

Id., at para. 57.
Ward, supra, note 86, at paras. 18 and 22; RJR-MacDonald, supra, note 57, at para. 44,
per La Forest J.; Ontario Hydro v. Ontario (Labour Relations Board), [1993] S.C.J. No. 99, [1993] 3
S.C.R. 327, at paras. 48-49 (S.C.C.), per Lamer C.J.C.; Reference re Firearms Act (Can.), supra,
note 87, at para. 57.
91
Justice McIntyre, speaking for the Court in Reference re Upper Churchill, supra, note 50,
stated at 334 that “it is not for this Court to consider the desirability of legislation from a social or
economic perspective where a constitutional issue is raised”. See also Laskin C.J.C. in Central Canada Potash Co. v. Saskatchewan, [1978] S.C.J. No. 72, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 42, at 76 (S.C.C.).
92
Reference re Firearms Act (Can.), supra, note 87, at para. 57.
93
Ward, supra, note 86, at para. 26 and Global Securities Corp., supra, note 79, at paras.
35-36.
94
City National Leasing, supra, note 65, at 668.
95
Id.
96
Id., at 684-85.
90
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ism.97 The Court also concluded that a proportionality test similar to the
one developed under section 1 of the Canadian Charter should not be
resorted to when courts are called upon to delimit the scope of the powers set out in sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.98
Virginity does not allow half-measures, likewise for constitutional
authority. Either a level of government is competent or it is not.
If a jurisdiction over securities is ever recognized to Parliament under the GRT power, one will be hard pressed to convince a court that the
reach of the legislation is too great or that provinces should have been
consulted, or that such recognition of power upsets the balance of federalism.
The second hurdle faced by those who would wish to see Parliament’s power over GRT curbed is that the Supreme Court, in recent
years, has become a staunch advocate of concurrent powers. Indeed, the
aspect doctrine and its corollary, the double aspect, now so dominate
constitutional thinking that we are witnessing a “ratatinement jurisprudentiel du principe d’exclusivité”,99 a judicial shrivelling of the
exclusivity principle.100
The Court quite systematically upholds provincial or federal legislation, resorting to the paramountcy principle to settle the issue of conflict
between federal and provincial legislation.101 Therefore, if the constitutional validity of federal securities legislation is ever challenged before
the Supreme Court, it stands a good chance of being upheld. The Court
will probably recoil at the idea of substituting a more conceptual definition of GRT, which would call for an explicit definition of its exclusive
core, to its present highly pragmatic and functional approach.

97

Reference re Firearms Act (Can.), supra, note 87, at para. 48.
Id. See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
99
“Des motifs juridiques et extra-juridiques expliquent le ratatinement jurisprudentiel du
principe d’exclusivité”: Jean-François Gaudreault-DesBiens, “Le Fédéralisme et le législateur fédéral” (2008) 2 Journal of Parliamentary and Political Law 427, at 444.
100
Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta, [2007] S.C.J. No. 22, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 3, 2007 SCC
22 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Canadian Western Bank”]. In his dissenting opinion, Bastarache J. rebelled
against the pragmatic approach of the majority, arguing for a more abstract approach to division of
powers issues (see para. 118).
101
See Bruce Ryder, “The End of Umpire? Federalism and Judicial Restraint” (2006) 34
S.C.L.R. (2d) 345 [hereinafter “Ryder”], noting the Court’s “disinclination, since the early 1980s, to
issue declarations of invalidity” in division of powers cases and an increasing resort to the paramouncy doctrine to limit the operation of provincial statutes (at 347).
98

(2010), 51 S.C.L.R. (2d) REGULATING SECURITIES, SECURING FEDERALISM

577

Interestingly enough, the Supreme Court justifies its refusal to define
the core of a legislative head of power by the danger it would entail for
provincial powers:
Excessive reliance on the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity
would create serious uncertainty. It is based on the attribution to every
legislative head of power of a “core” of indeterminate scope — difficult
to define, except over time by means of judicial interpretations
triggered serendipitously on a case-by-case basis. The requirement to
develop an abstract definition of a “core” is not compatible, generally
speaking, with the tradition of Canadian constitutional interpretation,
which favours an incremental approach. While it is true that the
enumerations of ss. 91 and 92 contain a number of powers that are
precise and not really open to discussion, other powers are far less
precise, such as those relating to the criminal law, trade and commerce
and matters of a local or private nature in a province. Since the time of
Confederation, courts have refrained from trying to define the possible
102
scope of such powers in advance and for all time ...

Justice Binnie goes on to explain that defining the core of a particular field of jurisdiction is particularly dangerous where the commerce
power is concerned:
For example, while the courts have not eviscerated the federal trade and
commerce power, they have, in interpreting it, sought to avoid draining
of their content the provincial powers over civil law and matters of a
local or private nature. A generalized application of interjurisdictional
immunity related to “trade and commerce” would have led to an
altogether different and more rigid and centralized form of federalism.
It was by proceeding with caution on a case-by-case basis that the
courts were gradually able to define the content of the heads of power
of Parliament and the legislatures, without denying the unavoidable
interplay between them, always having regard to the evolution of the
problems for which the division of legislative powers must now
103
provide solutions.

So then, trying to limit the extent of a federal power over GRT by
trying to define its exclusive core would not be an easy task to undertake.
In fact, such a strategy might backfire in the provinces’ faces. The central
government could end up with even more power than that with which it
is presently endowed.
102
103

Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 100, at para. 43.
Id.
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Third, the Court’s penchant for concurrency and “co-operative federalism”,104 its reticence towards the imposition of abstract limitations, its
emphasis “on the legitimate interplay between federal and provincial
powers”,105 its “concern that a court should favour, where possible, the
ordinary operation of statutes enacted by both levels of government”,106
all this translates into a willingness, where need be, to resort to the ancillary power doctrine to justify the validity of a federal107 or provincial
law.108
In fact, City National Leasing is a good example of a situation where
the Supreme Court offered one level of government the best of all
worlds: the disputed legislation was held to be intra vires on the basis of
the aspect doctrine, whereas the impugned provision was justified by recourse to the ancillary power. As we saw, Dickson C.J.C. held that it was
“sufficiently integrated into the Act to sustain its constitutionality”.109
The Kirkbi case followed the same approach, with the same result.110
Again, any strategy aimed at limiting the scope of Parliament’s power
would appear doomed to failure.
It bears underlining that the Court’s understanding of cooperative
federalism is radically different from that of the Privy Council. The
Court’s understanding is based on the conviction that “… the task of
maintaining the balance of powers in practice falls primarily to governments” and that, accordingly, “constitutional doctrine must facilitate, not
undermine what this Court has called ‘co-operative federalism’”.111 In
contrast, the Privy Council’s brand of cooperative federalism envisaged a
much greater role for courts. By strictly confining both levels of govern104
Multiple Access Ltd., supra, note 73, at 190; Husky Oil Operations Ltd. v. M.N.R., [1995]
S.C.J. No. 77, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 453, at para. 162 (S.C.C.); Reference re Employment Insurance Act
(Can.), ss. 22 and 23, [2005] S.C.J. No. 57, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 669, 2005 SCC 56, at para. 10 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Reference re Employment Insurance Act”]; Chatterjee v. Ontario (Attorney General),
[2009] S.C.J. No. 19, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 624, at para. 32 (S.C.C.) and Canadian Western Bank, supra,
note 100, at para. 24.
105
Canadian Western Bank, id., at para. 36.
106
Id., at para. 37.
107
City National Leasing, supra, note 65.
108
Kitkatla Band v. British Columbia (Minister of Small Business, Tourism and Culture),
[2002] S.C.J. No. 33, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 146, 2002 SCC 31 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Kitkatla Band”]; and
Global Securities Corp., supra, note 79.
109
City National Leasing, supra, note 65, at 670.
110
Supra, note 72, at para. 36 (finding that the “passing off” civil action in s. 7(b) of the
Trade-marks Act is “sufficiently integrated” in the Act’s legislative scheme that the Court found to
be valid pursuant to the GRT power). For a critical discussion of the result in Kirkbi, see Ryder,
supra, note 101, at 357-62.
111
Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 100, at para. 24.
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ment to the exercise of their exclusive powers, the Privy Council was in
fact imposing on the federal government an obligation to cooperate with
provinces.112 The modern brand of cooperative federalism affords a much
greater leeway to the central government. If it chooses to resort to its
paramount power, it could by-pass the provinces altogether. As Bruce
Ryder puts it, the Court’s approach puts the provinces
in the position of supplicants to the federal government. To secure
legislative space for the pursuit of distinct policy objectives, the
provinces must negotiate with a national government that is holding the
legal trump card — the federal paramountcy rule — in its hand ... So
long as the provincial pursuit of distinct policies in the growing areas of
shared jurisdiction is conditional upon federal consent or forbearance,
the provinces cannot be confident that their autonomy will be secured
113
in the future.

In Reference re Anti-Inflation Act,114 counsel for one of the interveners submitted that, instead of turning immediately to its emergency
power to regulate inflation, Parliament should have sought a federalprovincial cooperative scheme circumscribed by each level of government’s respective powers under sections 91 and 92. Chief Justice Laskin
bluntly rejected this suggestion in the following terms:
No doubt, federal-provincial co-operation along the lines suggested
might have been attempted, but it does not follow that the federal
policy that was adopted is vulnerable because a co-operative scheme on
a legislative power basis was not tried first. Co-operative federalism
may be consequential upon a lack of federal legislative power, but it is
115
not a ground for denying it.

I believe that the modern understanding of cooperative federalism is
more in tune with that of Laskin C.J.C. than that of the Privy Council.
This in no way facilitates attempts at limiting the reach of a federal
power.
Is there no way then to curtail the authority over securities which the
GRT power would confer on the central government?
112
See for instance Reference re Board of Commerce Act, 1919 (Alberta), [1921] J.C.J. No.
4, [1922] 1 A.C. 191, at 200-201 (P.C.); Reference re Weekly Rest in Industrial Undertakings Act
(Can.), [1937] J.C.J. No. 5, [1937] A.C. 326, at 353-54 and 403-404 (P.C.). See also the Supreme
Court decision in R. v. Eastern Terminal Elevator Co., [1925] S.C.J. No. 20, [1925] S.C.R. 434, at
448 (S.C.C.).
113
Ryder, supra, note 101, at 374 and 377.
114
Supra, note 4.
115
Id., at 421.
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V. DELIMITING THE REACH OF THE GENERAL REGULATION OF
TRADE POWER: RESORTING TO THE PARTICULAR NATURE
OF THIS FIELD OF JURISDICTION AS A NORMATIVE AND
METHODOLOGICAL YARDSTICK
Guaranteeing jurisdictional space for provinces over securities requires, as I have said before, a re-examination of the GRT power itself.
Two avenues are open that both emphasize the need to appeal to the particular nature of a field of jurisdiction as a measuring yardstick of its
potential reach: a normative approach and a methodological approach.
Both will now be analyzed.
1. The Normative Approach: Commerce as Competition
Out of the few elements that enable courts to assess the potential
range of a field of jurisdiction, the distinct nature of the latter is quite
certainly the most important. In other words, the singular essence of a
power will not only determine its compass but also the type of legislative
objectives that a level of government is allowed to pursue.116
In Hydro-Québec,117 La Forest J. stated that in determining the extent
of Parliament’s power over the environment, the nature of each and every
one of its powers had to be taken into account:
In examining the validity of legislation … , it must be underlined that
the nature of the relevant legislative powers must be examined.
Different types of legislative powers may support different types of
environmental provisions. The manner in which such provisions must
be related to a legislative scheme was, by way of example, discussed in
116
For more on this subject, see Jean Leclair, “L’impact de la nature d’une compétence législative sur l’étendue du pouvoir conféré dans le cadre de la Loi constitutionnelle de 1867” (1994) 24
Revue juridique Thémis 661-719, online: <http://hdl.handle.net/1866/2525> ; and Jean Leclair,
“L’étendue du pouvoir constitutionnel des provinces et de l’État central en matière d’évaluation des
incidences environnementales au Canada” (1995) 21 Queen’s L.J. 37.
117
Supra, note 55. In Friends of the Oldman River Society v. Canada (Minister of Transport), [1992] S.C.J. No. 1, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 3, at 67-68 (S.C.C.), La Forest J. had already underlined
that:
It must be noted that the exercise of legislative power, as it affects concerns relating to
the environment, must, as with other concerns, be linked to the appropriate head of
power, and since the nature of the various heads of power under the Constitution Act,
1867 differ, the extent to which environmental concerns may be taken into account in the
exercise of a power may vary from one power to another. For example, a somewhat different environmental role can be played by Parliament in the exercise of its jurisdiction
over fisheries than under its powers concerning railways or navigation since the former
involves the management of a resource, the others activities.
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Oldman River in respect of railways, navigable waters and fisheries. An
environmental provision may be validly aimed at curbing
environmental damage, but in some cases the environmental damage
may be directly related to the power itself. There is a considerable
difference between regulating works and activities, like railways, and a
resource like fisheries, and consequently the environmental provisions
relating to each of these. Environmental provisions must be tied to the
118
appropriate constitutional source.

The intrinsic limit of certain powers enables courts to define, with a
certain degree of precision, the bounds of their reach or the type of interventions they authorize. For instance, the criminal law power requires
that there be an element of danger in the activity, the person or the thing
regulated. Absent such danger, section 91(27) cannot be invoked.119
Likewise, Ottawa’s power over fisheries does not allow it to control local
logging operations on the sole basis that they might have deleterious effects on fish.120 To be valid, a federal provision based on such
jurisdiction must link the proscribed conduct to actual or potential harm
to fisheries. A blanket prohibition of certain types of activity falling under provincial power is not sufficiently linked to any likely harm to
fisheries.
Therefore, in the execution of their mandate as arbiters of federalism,
courts are allowed to invoke the particular nature of a field of jurisdiction
to limit its reach. What of the GRT power? Could the singular nature of
that field of jurisdiction enable courts to limit its ambit?
At first glance, one would think that there are no internal limits imposed by the nature of such a power. GRT grants the right to regulate
both the intra- and the extraprovincial dimensions of a “trade” matter, as
long as the latter is aimed at the economy as a single integrated national
unit rather than as a collection of separate local enterprises. Provided that
the matter regulated possesses the required quiddity, all methods seem
therefore legitimate, whether they impinge on provincial powers or not.
However, a closer look at the reasoning of Dickson C.J.C. in City National Leasing might cast some light on the issue.
In that case, Dickson C.J.C. clearly emphasized the fundamental importance of efficiency in determining whether power should or should not
118

Hydro-Québec, id., at para. 114.
For example, see RJR-MacDonald, supra, note 57; Hydro-Quebec, id., and R. v. Swain,
[1991] S.C.J. No. 32, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 933 (S.C.C.).
120
R. v. Fowler, [1980] S.C.J. No. 58, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 213 (S.C.C.). See also R. v. Northwest Falling Contractors Ltd., [1980] S.C.J. No. 68, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 292 (S.C.C.).
119
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be recognized to Parliament under the GRT rubric. As we saw earlier,
one of the constitutional triggers of that power is empirical evidence that
“the failure to include one or more provinces or localities in a [federal]
legislative scheme would jeopardize the successful operation of the
scheme in other parts of the country”.121 In other words, one must demonstrate that the failure to include one or more provinces would lead to
inefficiency. After reviewing arguments on that subject in Section VIII of
the decision,122 Dickson C.J.C. came to the conclusion that “[these arguments] ma[d]e it clear that not only is the Act meant to cover
intraprovincial trade, but that it must do so if it is to be effective”.123 Earlier on, he had peremptorily asserted: “It is evident from this discussion
that competition cannot be effectively regulated unless it is regulated nationally.”124
If efficiency is of such moment for determining the existence of a
federal power under GRT, could it not be argued that the very nature of
that power demands that efficiency be taken seriously? In other words,
since all fields of jurisdiction comprehend both a descriptive and a normative dimension, should not the courts be forced to require credible
evidence, based on empirically valid conclusions, as to the exact nature
of the strengths and the weaknesses of the Canadian securities market?
From a more normative perspective, could it not be contended that commerce is more in tune with competition than with monopoly, with
diversity and experimentation than with uniformity?
A normative perspective sympathetic to competition is also infinitely
more compatible with a federal structure of government. The Supreme
Court is oftentimes lyrically eloquent when economic imperatives are
said to justify by-passing territorial barriers.125 In Hunt, for instance, La
Forest J. noted that, Canada being a federation, the traditional rules of
private international law emphasizing sovereignty needed to be softened.
Ironically, he claimed that these rules seemed “to ‘fly in the face of the
121

City National Leasing, supra, note 65, at 662.
That section is entitled “The Validity of the Regulatory Scheme”, therefore demonstrating that efficiency criteria were here invoked to justify the validity of the whole scheme. Efficiency
was also resorted to uphold the validity of the impugned section (City National Leasing, id., at 686
and 693-94).
123
Id., at 681 (emphasis added).
124
Id., at 680 (emphasis added).
125
Hunt, supra, note 50. Strangely enough, although absolutely pivotal in the advent of the
Canadian federation, apart from a vague reference at paras. 42 and 96, next to no mention is made of
economic factors as justifying the 1867 union in the Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] S.C.J.
No. 61, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (S.C.C.).
122
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obvious intention of the Constitution to create a single country’”.126
Though I agree with La Forest J., conversely, it could also be contended
that, Canada being a federation, care must be taken not to bestow the entirety of economic control in the hands of one level of government. A
true federal spirit requires an assessment of both the virtue of unity and
that of diversity.
This keenness for uniformity also translates into a presumption that
federalism necessarily entails the pursuit of harmony. In Canadian Western Bank, Binnie J. mentioned “foster[ing] co-operation among
governments and legislatures for the common good” as one of the fundamental objectives of federalism.127 But how about legitimate and
fruitful interprovincial competition? If, as the same Binnie J. tells us,
constitutional doctrines “must also be designed to reconcile the legitimate diversity of regional experimentation with the need for national
unity”,128 then commerce, it would seem, is the ideal sphere where such
experimentation should be encouraged.
Although it sometimes appears as if interprovincial competition is an
expression to be avoided129 — this might have to do with the fact that
provincial disharmony is a trigger for the setting in motion of the GRT
power — our constitutional structure is designed to stimulate and promote it. In Canadian Egg Marketing Agency v. Richardson,130 Iaccobucci
and Bastarache JJ., for the majority, said the following:
The federal structure of our Constitution authorizes the growth of
distinct systems of commercial regulation whose application is
inevitably defined “in terms of provincial boundaries”. Provincial
126
Hunt, id., at 322, quoting Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye, [1990] S.C.J. No.
135, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077, at 1099 (S.C.C.). The Morguard quotation is worth reproducing in its
entirety:
In any event, the English rules seem to me to fly in the face of the obvious intention of
the Constitution to create a single country. This presupposes a basic goal of stability and
unity where many aspects of life are not confined to one jurisdiction. A common citizenship ensured the mobility of Canadians across provincial lines, a position reinforced
today by s. 6 of the Charter ... In particular, significant steps were taken to foster economic integration. One of the central features of the constitutional arrangements
incorporated in the Constitution Act, 1867 was the creation of a common market. Barriers
to interprovincial trade were removed by s. 121. Generally trade and commerce between
the provinces was seen to be a matter of concern to the country as a whole; see Constitution Act, 1867, s. 91(2). The Peace, Order and Good Government clause gives the federal
Parliament powers to deal with interprovincial activities ... And the combined effect of
s. 91(29) and s. 92(10) does the same for interprovincial works and undertakings.
127
Supra, note 100, at para. 22.
128
Id., at para. 24.
129
Sabbah, supra, note 11, at 64 and 75-76.
130
Supra, note 51.
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legislation validly enacted under s. 92 of the Constitution is applicable
only within a single province and may have an effect on the conditions
according to which a livelihood may be pursued. Federal legislation, or
cooperative federal-provincial legislative schemes, may also apply only
in some provinces and, thus, create variable conditions for the pursuit
of a livelihood in different provinces ... This type of economic
legislation, and the growth of divergent regulatory regimes in the
131
provinces, is undoubtedly authorized by the Constitution.

Canada not being a unitary state, judges as arbiters of federalism
must therefore reflect upon the economic and commercial benefits that
can flow from decentralization. Some of these benefits have been described in Part II and, therefore, need not be reiterated.132
Another argument in favour of a complementary federal-provincial
approach in economic and commercial matters is that, when confronted
with a potentially all-encompassing subject matter, the Supreme Court has
generally refused to confine its regulation to one level of government.
Hence, what was deemed appropriate for inflation and environment should
also be applied to economic and commercial regulation.
Indeed, a tried and true solution exists when Canadian legislatures
seek to endow a single regulator with jurisdiction to address both the
intra- and extraprovincial dimensions of trade.133 Divided jurisdiction
over trade, a fundamental feature of Canadian federalism since Parsons,134 can be overcome through a cooperative scheme of interlocking
federal and provincial legislation, using techniques such as administrative delegation and incorporation by reference. This is precisely the
approach that the courts have encouraged and sanctioned in contexts
such as the regulation of trucking and agricultural products marketing.135
For example, in Fédération des producteurs de volailles du Québec v.
Pelland, the Court upheld legislation that conferred jurisdiction over the
intra- and extraprovincial marketing of chickens on a Quebec board.
Justice Abella, writing for a unanimous Court, noted that “[e]ach level of
131

Id., at paras. 61-63.
See also Robert Wisner, “Uniformity, Diversity and Provincial Extraterritoriality: Hunt v.
T&N plc” (1995) 40 McGill L.J. 759, at 772-73.
133
I am grateful to Bruce Ryder for the observations in this paragraph.
134
Supra, note 67.
135
Prince Edward Island (Potato Marketing Board) v. H.B. Willis Inc., [1952] S.C.J. No. 31,
[1952] 2 S.C.R. 392 (S.C.C.); Coughlin v. Ontario (Highway Transport Board), [1968] S.C.J. No.
38, [1968] S.C.R. 569 (S.C.C.); Reference re Agricultural Products Marketing Act, 1970, [1978]
S.C.J. No. 58, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1198 (S.C.C.); Fédération des producteurs de volailles du Québec v.
Pelland, [2005] S.C.J. No. 19, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 292 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Pelland”].
132
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government enacted laws and regulations, based on their respective legislative competencies, to create a unified and coherent regulatory
scheme.”136 In response to objections to the scheme, she held that its constitutional validity is supported by “a venerable chain of judicial
precedent”.137 The federal government’s draft Securities Act, in contrast,
chooses to assert federal jurisdiction over both the intra- and extraprovincial aspects of securities regulation, with no legislative support
from the provinces. Rather than push the limits of the GRT power and
strain the federal principle, if the federal government truly wants to pursue a constitutionally sound, cooperative approach to endowing a single
regulator with jurisdiction over all aspects of securities regulation, it
should follow the “well-established body of precedent upholding the validity of administrative delegation in aid of cooperative federalism”.138
Finally, in interpreting the meaning to be given to a particular field of
power, courts should be “guided by the way in which courts have interpreted the power in the past”139 and attention should be given to the
manner in which past judges have apprehended “the activity at stake”.140
Now, provinces have been validly regulating securities for next to
100 years141 with the courts’ repeated approval.142 Provincial power has
been said to encompass both a territorial and a personal dimension.143
Besides, as we have seen in Part II, provinces have managed to put in
place a system that, although not perfect, is quite efficient. All this should
hinder attempts at interpreting the GRT power in such a way as to deprive provinces of a meaningful authority over securities.
Divesting provinces of that power would also go against the grain of
the democratic principle. Indeed, the Court seems intent on ensuring,
through constitutional doctrines such as the double aspect doctrine, “that
the policies of the elected legislators of both levels of government are
136

Pelland, id., at para. 38.
Id., at para. 52.
138
Id., at para. 55.
139
Reference re Employment Insurance Act, supra, note 104, at para. 10.
140
Ward, supra, note 86, at para. 43.
141
See supra, notes 36 to 46 and accompanying text.
142
Luckey v. Ruthenian Farmers’ Elevator Co., [1923] S.C.J. No. 42, [1924] S.C.R. 56
(S.C.C.); Manitoba (Attorney General) v. Canada (Attorney General), [1929] A.C. 260, 1 D.L.R.
369; Lymburn, supra, note 75; R. v. Smith, [1960] S.C.J. No. 47, [1960] S.C.R 776 (S.C.C.); Gregory & Co. v. Québec (Securities Commission), [1961] S.C.J. No. 38, [1961] S.C.R. 584 (S.C.C.);
Multiple Access Ltd., supra, note 73; Global Securities Corp., supra, note 79; R. v. W. McKenzie
Securities Ltd., [1966] M.J. No. 3, [1966] 4 C.C.C. 29 (Man. C.A.); Bennett v. British Columbia
(Securities Commission), [1991] B.C.J. No. 1021, 82 D.L.R (4th) 129 (B.C.S.C.); Pearson v. Boliden, [2002] B.C.J. No. 2593, 2002 BCCA 624 (B.C.C.A.).
143
Global Securities Corp., supra, note 79, at para. 42.
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respected”.144 Discarding 100 years of provincial efforts at regulating
securities would fly in the face of the obvious intention of the Constitution to create a federal country.
Moreover, in examining the breadth to be given to a federal power
over securities regulation, arguments of efficiency should not conceal the
importance, for provinces, of the indirect revenues generated — through
taxation for example — by the securities industry, i.e., revenues flowing
from the establishment of financial services providers, legal and investment firms, etc.145
If stock is taken of all that has been said already, it becomes possible
to argue for a federal power strictly confined to matters over which the
provinces are constitutionally incompetent. An argument of that very nature was successfully adduced in Ontario Hydro v. Ontario (Labour
Relations Board).146
In that case, the Supreme Court had to decide whether federal labour
relations legislation applied to employees working at provincial nuclear
electrical generating stations. The latter had been declared to be to the
general advantage of Canada under subsection 92(10)(c) and section
91(29) of the Constitution Act, 1867. In addition, atomic energy has been
recognized as falling under Parliament’s power under section 91 of that
Act to make laws for the peace, order and good government (“POGG”)
of Canada. The question therefore hinged upon whether Parliament’s exclusive jurisdiction over Ontario Hydro’s nuclear electrical generating
plants under the POGG power or the declaratory power extended to labour relations. In other words, was the central government invested with
a plenary power over atomic energy? Justice Iacobucci, speaking for a
majority of the Court on that particular issue,147 answered this question in
the negative:
144

Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 100, at para. 30; see also para. 37.
Sabbah, supra, note 11, at 83. For an assessment of the negative economic repercussions
linked to the establishment of a single national securities commission, see Daniel Denis, Enjeux
économiques associés à la mise en place d’une commission unique, SECOR (April 2010), online:
<http://www.lautorite.qc.ca/index.fr.html>.
146
Supra, note 90.
147
Of the seven judges that heard the case, four (Lamer C.J.C. and La Forest, L’HeureuxDubé and Gonthier JJ.) decided that labour relations were integral to Parliament’s declaratory and
POGG jurisdictions. Yet only three of them (La Forest, L’Heureux-Dubé and Gonthier JJ.) were of
the opinion that Parliament could so act because of the plenary nature of its power. As for Lamer
C.J.C., although concurring in the result, he nevertheless shared the dissenters’ opinion (Sopinka,
Cory and Iacobucci JJ.) to the effect that Parliament’s power was not plenary (at 340):
Rather, federal jurisdiction over such works must be carefully described to respect and
give effect to the division of legislative authority on which our federal constitutional
scheme is based. Under s. 92(10)(c), I fully agree with Iacobucci J. that “Parliament’s
145
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To summarize, the federal declaratory power is unique in that under it,
Parliament may decide as a matter of policy to withdraw a work or an
undertaking linked to works from what would normally be provincial
jurisdiction by declaring the work or undertaking to be a work for the
general advantage of Canada, or of two or more provinces.
Parliament’s jurisdiction over a declared work is not plenary, but
extends only to those aspects of the work which make the work
specifically of federal jurisdiction. Put another way, Parliament obtains
exclusive jurisdiction to regulate those aspects of the work that are
148
integral to the federal interest in the work.

Justice Iacobucci was of the opinion that labour relations did not
constitute one such aspect.
Justice La Forest, dissenting on this issue, stated that there was no
authority supporting the view that either the POGG power or the declaratory power should be narrowly construed because of the danger a
liberal interpretation of these fields of jurisdiction might pose to the
structure of Canadian federalism.149 Once a declaration is made, or
once a matter is said to fall under the POGG power, “the legislative
power flowing therefrom is governed by the Constitution”.150 According to La Forest J., “protection against abuse of these draconian powers
is left to the inchoate but very real and effective political forces that
undergird federalism”.151
Inasmuch as La Forest J.’s opinion was not approved by a majority
of the Court, an argument can be forged upon the reasoning of Iacobucci
J. Hence, since GRT allows for recognition to Parliament of a power over
both the intra- and the extraprovincial facets of securities regulation,
jurisdiction over a declared work must be limited so as to respect the powers of the provincial legislatures but consistent with the appropriate recognition of the federal interests
involved”... The POGG power is similarly subject to balancing federal principles, limiting the federal government’s POGG jurisdiction to “the national concern aspects of
atomic energy ... namely the fact of nuclear production and its safety concerns”.
148
Id., at 404-405. He applied the same reasoning to the POGG power (at 424). Justice
Dickson adopted the same kind of restrictive approach in Schneider v. British Columbia, [1982]
S.C.J. No. 64, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 112, at 131-32 (S.C.C.):
There is no material before the Court leading one to conclude that the problem of heroin
dependency as distinguished from illegal trade in drugs is a matter of national interest and
dimension transcending the power of each province to meet and solve its own way. It is
not a problem which “is beyond the power of the provinces to deal with” … I do not
think the subject of narcotics is so global and indivisible that the legislative domain cannot be divided, illegal trade in narcotics coming within the jurisdiction of the Parliament
of Canada and the treatment of addicts under provincial jurisdiction.
149
Id., at 370-71.
150
Id., at 373.
151
Id., at 372.
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thereby encroaching deeply on a matter that would normally fall under
provincial jurisdiction, one might contend that Parliament should be authorized to regulate the intraprovincial aspects of securities if, and only
if, credible evidence is put forward demonstrating that such regulation
would lead to more efficiency.
The exclusive power recognized to Parliament over “maritime law”
provides an interesting counter-example. In that case, the nature of the
power, more so than would be the case for securities regulation, called
for an integrated and unified regulatory regime:
Quite apart from judicial authority, the very nature of the activities of
navigation and shipping, at least as they are practised in this country,
makes a uniform maritime law which encompasses navigable inland
waterways a practical necessity. Much of the navigational and shipping
activity that takes place on Canada’s inland waterways is closely
connected with that which takes place within the traditional geographic
sphere of maritime law. … For it would be quite incredible, especially
when one considers that much of maritime law is the product of
international conventions, if the legal rights and obligations of those
engaged in navigation and shipping arbitrarily changed as their vessels
crossed the point at which the water ceased or, as the case may be,
commenced to ebb and flow. Such a geographic divide is, from a
division of powers perspective, completely meaningless, for it does not
indicate any fundamental change in the use to which a waterway is put.
In this country, inland navigable waterways and the seas that were
traditionally recognized as the province of maritime law are part of the
same navigational network, one which should, in my view, be subject
to a uniform legal regime.
I think it obvious that this need for legal uniformity is particularly
pressing in the area of tortious liability for collisions and other
152
accidents that occur in the course of navigation.

The same reasoning does not apply in matters of securities. As I have
mentioned earlier,153 Canada’s securities market is very diversified, some
provincial regulators specializing in particular sectors. This diversity encourages specialization and innovation. Therefore, it would not be
accurate to state that, in the case of securities, “a geographic divide is,
from a division of powers perspective, completely meaningless”.

152
153

Whitbread v. Walley, [1990] S.C.J. No. 138, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1273, at 1294-96 (S.C.C.).
See text accompanying notes 19 and 20, supra.
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Finally, the failure of Parliament as an interregional bargaining forum,154 as an institution that can counterbalance the centrifugal effects of
Supreme Court decisions enhancing Ottawa’s power,155 brings some additional legitimacy to such a prudent approach.
From the preceding discussion, it could therefore be argued that, if
the nature of the GRT jurisdiction is duly considered, the power it confers over securities should be strictly confined to matters over which
provinces are constitutionally incompetent. Competition being the essence of trade, any attempt by Parliament to impose a set of uniform
rules in sectors that traditionally have fallen under provincial jurisdiction
should be prohibited. Furthermore, the process required to attain harmonization in a jurisdictionally divided system of securities regulation
stands a better chance of insuring the growth of a federal ethic than the
unilateral imposition of national rules. Indeed, uniform standards can
only be adopted by provinces willing to mitigate their autonomy claims
so as to insure the benefit of all.
To be quite honest though, there is little chance that such a radical
approach will meet with the approval of the Court. Indeed, the whole
purpose of “inventing” the GRT power was precisely to bestow on Parliament an authority it did not possess before, i.e., the right to prescribe
uniform rules in a sector — intraprovincial trade and commerce — that
traditionally has fallen under provincial jurisdiction.
If so, then, at the very least, a specific methodological approach
should guide the courts called upon to determine whether the GRT power
should be triggered. This will be the object of the final section of this
article.
2. The Methodological Approach: Measuring Efficiency
The approach developed by Dickson C.J.C. in City National Leasing
to identify matters that could potentially fall within GRT is equivalent, in
the words of Noura Karazivan and Jean-François Gaudreault-DesBiens,
to a “non-evidence based approach”.156 Indeed, as we shall see, the test is
154
See Jean Leclair, “Jane Austen and the Council of the Federation” (2006) 15 Constitutional Forum 51.
155
Noemi Gal-Or, “In Search of Unity in Separateness: Interprovincial Trade, Territory, and
Canadian Federalism” (1997-98) 9 National Journal of Constitutional Law 307, at 333.
156
Noura Karazivan & Jean-François Gaudreault-DesBiens, “On Polyphony and Paradoxes
in the Regulation of Securities within the Canadian Federation” (2010) 49 Can. Bus. L.J. 1, at 22
[hereinafter “Karazivan & Gaudreault-DesBiens”].
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no test at all. It is a purely rhetorical device. As a result, a much more
stringent methodological approach is needed, one that will safeguard the
diversity required at once by economic efficiency and by the principle of
federalism. According to such an approach Parliament would only be
authorized to regulate the intraprovincial aspects of securities if, and only
if, it succeeds in bringing forward credible empirical evidence demonstrating that its intervention would lead to greater efficiency.
(a) The Problematic Nature of the “Provincial Incapacity” Test
For clarity’s sake, let us recall the last three identification criteria formulated by Dickson C.J.C.:
… (iii) the legislation must be concerned with trade as a whole rather
than with a particular industry; (iv) the legislation should be of a nature
that provinces jointly or severally would be constitutionally incapable
of enacting; and (v) the failure to include one or more provinces or
localities in a legislative scheme would jeopardize the successful
operation of the scheme in other parts of the country … These factors
are not exhaustive and, to be valid, it is not necessary for federal
157
legislation to satisfy all five criteria.

In a word, federal jurisdiction will be said to exist if provinces are
incapable of regulating efficiently a particular field of the economy.158
The “provincial incapacity” criterion has enjoyed some success over
the last decades. Its use has not been confined to the GRT power. It has
also been harnessed in the POGG case law to determine whether a matter
has attained the required degree of singleness that clearly distinguishes it
from matters of provincial concern and justifies considering it a single
indivisible matter of national interest.159
The “provincial incapacity” criterion is extremely problematic. First,
it was mobilized and applied by the Supreme Court itself in a very erratic

157

As summarized in Kirkbi, supra, note 72, at para. 17.
I have already briefly addressed the issue of “provincial incapacity”, see supra, notes 80
to 83 and accompanying text.
159
Crown Zellerbach, supra, note 4, at 432:
In determining whether a matter has attained the required degree of singleness, distinctiveness and indivisibility that clearly distinguishes it from matters of provincial concern it
is relevant to consider what would be the effect on extra-provincial interests of a provincial failure to deal effectively with the control or regulation of the intra-provincial aspects
of the matter.
158
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manner160 that shows how devoid of any logical barriers a functional test
can be.
Second, what does “provincial incapacity” mean? Does it refer to jurisdictional or political inability? Could not 100 years of successful
securities regulation count as evidence of “provincial capacity”?
Could it mean unwillingness to cooperate then? It does seem that
evidence of unwillingness to cooperate might be judicially equated with
provincial incapacity. In Multiple Access Ltd., Dickson J. (as he then
was) quoted with approval the following excerpt taken from an article
written by Philip Anisman:161
[T]he factors that indicated a need for federal regulatory involvement in
the securities market in 1979 are still present and, if anything, have
been reinforced by events during the past two years. … The fact that
the market is national in scope has long been acknowledged and is
demonstrated by the cooperative efforts of the provincial commissions
with respect to the adoption of national policies and by the statutory
authorization for and increasing frequency of joint hearings held by a
number of provincial commissions to decide issues that transcend
162
provincial boundaries.

It is somewhat baffling to realize that the provinces’ willingness to
cooperate with one another to harmonize regulation over a matter that
falls under their jurisdiction could count as a reason for vesting legislative power over that very same subject matter with the federal
government. Furthermore, since when is provincial willingness or unwillingness to cooperate on matters allocated under section 92 of the
Constitution Act, 1867 a reason to upset the balance of power in the Canadian federation?163 Is not a federation based on a principle of
autonomy and diversity?
This leads us to the third difficulty raised by the provincial incapacity test. As Karazivan and Gaudreault-DesBiens underscore, Dickson
C.J.C.’s approach is founded on the two following premises: effectiveness can only be achieved by the federal polity and efficiency is

160
See Jean Leclair, “The Elusive Quest for the Quintessential ‘National Interest’”, supra,
note 55; Jean Leclair, “La théorie des dimensions nationales: une boîte à phantasmes — Canada
(Procureur général) c. R.J.R. MacDonald Inc.” (1993) 72 Can. Bar Rev. 524.
161
Philip Anisman, “The Proposals for a Securities Market Law for Canada: Purpose and
Process” (1981) 19 Osgoode Hall L.J. 329, at 352.
162
Supra, note 73, at 174.
163
Karazivan & Gaudreault-DesBiens, supra, note 156, at 23.
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reducible to uniformity.164 However, as I have tried to demonstrate in
Part II, these are normative statements that do not appear to be validated
by empirical reality.
The empirical laxity of Dickson C.J.C.’s trigger test constitutes the
last, but not the least, important flaw that needs to be addressed.
(b) Efficiency and Empirical Evidence
Notwithstanding the uncertainty surrounding the purport of “provincial incapacity”, it is safe to conjecture that, in the final analysis, this
criterion will be understood as conferring jurisdiction to Parliament over
certain specific trade matters if provinces are incapable of regulating
them efficiently.
The nature of the GRT power, its very definition, imposes the recourse, not to a conceptual, but to a highly functional approach.165 And
although, as we saw earlier, empirical evidence of efficiency or inefficiency is generally forbidden when the constitutional validity of
legislation is at stake, such a prohibition does not operate where the existence of a constitutional power commands that facts be demonstrated.
In general, one needs only show that there is “a rational basis for the
legislation” in the head of power invoked in support of its validity.166 For
instance, in Reference re Anti-Inflation Act, Laskin C.J.C. underlined
that, in considering the extrinsic evidence put forward to establish the
existence of an emergency, “the Court does not look at [such evidence] in
terms of whether it provides proof of the exceptional circumstances as a
matter of fact. The matter concerns social and economic policy and
hence governmental and legislative judgment.”167 Consequently, in that
164

Id., at 25-26.
Katherine Swinton, “Federalism Under Fire: The Role of the Supreme Court of Canada”
(1992) 55:1 Law & Contemp. Probs. 120, at 133:
The judicial perspective has shifted from the conceptual (that is, is this a problem with a
situs outside the territorial reach of the legislature which might wish to regulate it?) to the
functional (is this a problem affecting the national interest, even if much of the regulation
will fall within a province?). Once we shift to the functional, we face the perennial problem of criteria for national importance.
166
Reference re Anti-Inflation Act, supra, note 4, at 423; see also 420. In Provincial Court
Judges’ Assn. of New Brunswick v. New Brunswick (Minister of Justice); Ontario Judges’ Assn. v.
Ontario (Management Board); Bodner v. Alberta; Conférence des juges du Québec v. Quebec (Attorney General); Minc v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 47, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 286,
2005 SCC 44, at para. 37 (S.C.C.), a unanimous Court specified that “… determin[ing] whether it is
rational for the government to rely on the stated facts or circumstances … is done by looking at the
soundness of the facts in relation to the position the government has adopted in its response”.
167
Reference re Anti-Inflation, id., at 423.
165
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case, even though the extrinsic evidence tended to demonstrate that the
impugned legislation would fail at curbing inflation, a majority of judges
nevertheless concluded that there was a rational basis for the Act as a
crisis measure. The Anti-Inflation case demonstrates, yet again, that once
a power is recognized to a level of government, courts are prohibited
from scrutinizing the manner in which that power is exercised.
The nature of the emergency power might explain the low threshold
of evidence prescribed by the Court in Reference re Anti-Inflation Act.
The decision to declare a state of national emergency is contingent upon
a careful appraisal of many political, economic and social variables that
do not necessarily all point in the same direction. The final choice is
therefore highly political and should not fall to be made by unaccountable magistrates.
Other heads of power might, however, justify the imposition of a
more substantial burden of proof. In Kitkatla Band, the Supreme Court
had to determine whether or not a provincial law of general application
could be said to so affect the essential and distinctive values of Indianness that it would engage the federal power over Indians and lands
reserved for the Indians (section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867).
After pointing out that constitutional questions should not be discussed in
a factual vacuum, LeBel J. stated that “[e]ven in a division of powers
case, rights must be asserted and their factual underpinnings demonstrated.”168 In this case, the appellants were claiming that the impugned
legislation touched upon the core of their cultural values and identity —
their Indianness — and, as a consequence, on a federal head of power.
More specifically, the legislation allowed for the destruction of culturally
modified trees the band claimed as theirs. “Because of this assertion,”
LeBel J. said, “the nature and quality of the evidence offered will have to
be assessed and discussed.”169 He then referred to the evidentiary standards applicable in Aboriginal law cases and asserted that they were
applicable, even if the case at hand was a division of powers case.170 After confirming that oral evidence of Aboriginal values, customs and
practices was necessary and relevant, he made the following comments:
Nevertheless, this kind of evidence must be evaluated like any other.
Claims must be established on a balance of probabilities, by persuasive
evidence …
168
169
170

Kitkatla Band, supra, note 108, at para. 46.
Id.
Id.
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The appellants attempted to downplay the importance and relevance of
this issue by stressing that this Court was not faced with a claim of
aboriginal rights or title. As stated above, facts must be established in
order to demonstrate in this case that there exists a conflict between
171
federal and provincial legislative powers.

In this respect, he concluded that the factual basis of the claim
looked weak and he eventually denied the existence of any conflict.
As we saw earlier, GRT aims at conferring jurisdiction to Parliament
over certain specific trade matters where a court comes to the conclusion
that provinces are incapable of regulating them efficiently. According to
the reasoning expounded in Kitkatla Band, the factual underpinnings of a
claim of inefficiency must therefore be established by the party alleging
it. And to paraphrase LeBel J., because of this assertion of inefficiency,
the nature and quality of the evidence offered will have to be assessed
and discussed. Such a claim will have to be established on a balance of
probabilities, by persuasive evidence. Even more so in a context where,
once proven, such inefficiency will endow Parliament with jurisdiction to
legislate over matters that traditionally fell within the provinces’ exclusive sphere of power.
Upon what kind of evidence did Dickson C.J.C. rely, in City National
Leasing, to recognize to the central government a power over the regulation of intra- and extraprovincial competition? What kind of evidence was
adduced to establish provincial incapacity to regulate efficiently?
Two doctrinal sources were invoked. Most striking about these is
their purely normative content. The long excerpt taken from the first
one172 written by Peter W. Hogg and Warren Grover,173 begins as follows:
“It is surely obvious that major regulation of the Canadian economy has
to be national.” It then goes on enumerating a number of very general
assertions of the following type: “Goods and services, and the cash or
credit which purchases them, flow freely from one part of the country to
another without regard for provincial boundaries”; “[a]n over-all national
policy is the key to efficiency in the production of goods and services”;
“[a]ny attempt to achieve an optimal distribution of economic activity
must transcend provincial boundaries”; “with few exceptions, any individual or corporation, including a provincially incorporated corporation,
has the capacity to ‘walk across’ provincial boundaries in order to buy or
171

Id., at paras. 46-47.
City National Leasing, supra, note 65, at 679.
Peter W. Hogg & Warren Grover, “The Constitutionality of the Competition Bill” (1976)
1 Can. Bus. L.J. 197, at 199-200.
172
173

(2010), 51 S.C.L.R. (2d) REGULATING SECURITIES, SECURING FEDERALISM

595

sell, lend or borrow, hire or fire,” etc. A predictable conclusion ensues
from all this: “the market for goods and services is competitive on a national basis, and provincial legislation cannot be an effective regulator”.
As for the second study, it is even more prescriptive than the first, if
possible. The first two lines of the quote174 taken from A.E. Safarian’s
Canadian Federalism and Economic Integration say it all: “Competition
policy can be used most effectively to support the common market if it is
within federal power. With mobility of goods, it is quite unrealistic to
attempt to maintain diverse provincial competition policies.”175 In the
words of Karazivan and Gaudreault-DesBiens:
These statements are general observations on interprovincial
integration; they do not allow targeting a specific line of argument
related to effectiveness in either qualitative or quantitative terms. More
specifically, neither the positive added-value of federal legislation nor
the negative aspects of provinces’ inability to regulate the field were
substantiated; that is, the provinces’ incapacity to regulate the field has
not been demonstrated, nor have the federal government’s superior
176
abilities in the field been proven.

In point of fact, the authors’ assertions are normative statements
founded on the belief of the provinces’ ontological incapacity to work for
the economic good of Canada as a whole. Normative statements
morphed by Dickson C.J.C. into empirical truths.177 After referring to the
above mentioned quotes, he concludes that “[i]t is evident from this discussion that competition cannot be effectively regulated unless it is
regulated nationally.”178
174

City National Leasing, supra, note 65, at 679-80.
(Ottawa: Privy Council Office, 1974) at 58.
176
Supra, note 156, at 17.
177
Discussing the conclusions of Hogg & Grover, Karazivan and Gaudreault-DesBiens conclude, id., at 16, footnote 65:
With all due respect, this is an argument, not a formal demonstration, let alone an empirical one. In no way does it really address the provinces’ ability (or lack thereof) to
legislate, from their own constitutional standpoint, in view of facilitating or fostering the
economic union. On the contrary, it seems to assume that provinces are ontologically incapable to work for the economic good of Canada as a whole. In other words, even if
Professors Hogg and Grover’s argument may be philosophically or economically appealing to some, it looks, in the end, like a petition of principle.
178
City National Leasing, supra, note 65, at 680. At 683, Dickson C.J.C. would again resort
to Hogg’s and Grover’s opinion as a means of buttressing his normative conclusion. He quotes extensively the following passage of his own dissenting opinion in Canadian National Transportation,
supra, note 66, at 278:
A scheme aimed at the regulation of competition is in my view an example of the genre
of legislation that could not practically or constitutionally be enacted by a provincial
175
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In Kirkbi, the Supreme Court considered whether the civil action for
passing off in section 7(b) of the Trade-marks Act is a valid exercise of
the GRT power. The validity of the Act was not directly challenged by
the parties, and the Court seemed to assume, with little discussion, that
the Act a whole was valid. The few comments that LeBel J. did make on
behalf of the Court suggest that normative assumptions similar to those
operating in City National Leasing shaped the Court’s views on the validity of the Trade-marks Act pursuant to the GRT power:
The Trade-marks Act is clearly concerned with trade as a whole, as
opposed to within a particular industry. There is no question that trademarks apply across and between industries in different provinces.
Divided provincial and federal jurisdiction could mean that the
provincial law could be changed by each provincial legislature. This
could result in unregistered trade-marks that were more strongly
protected than registered trade-marks, undermining the efficacy and
integrity of the federal Parliament’s Trade-marks Act. The lack of a
civil remedy integrated into the scheme of the Act, applicable to all
marks, registered or unregistered, might also lead to duplicative or
conflicting and hence inefficient enforcement procedures
… if trade-marks are intended to protect the goodwill or reputation
associated with a particular business and to prevent confusion in the
marketplace, then a comprehensive scheme dealing with both registered
and unregistered trade-marks is necessary to ensure adequate
179
protection.

As explained already, my thesis is that the nature of GRT calls for a
much more substantial burden of proof. Such power being ontologically
linked to the existence of provincial inefficiency, then efficiency’s logic
must be played to the hilt. If Parliament is to win the day, it must establish on a balance of probabilities, by persuasive evidence, that the failure
to include one or more provinces or localities in its legislative scheme
would jeopardize the efficient regulation of securities in Canada as a
government. Given the free flow of trade across provincial borders guaranteed by s. 121
of the Constitution Act, 1867 Canada is, for economic purposes, a single huge marketplace. If competition is to be regulated at all it must be regulated federally. This fact leads
to the syllogism cited by Hogg and Grover, [supra, note 173] at p. 200:
... regulation of the competitive sector of the economy can be effectively accomplished
only by federal action. If there is no federal power to enact a competition policy, then
Canada cannot have a competition policy. The consequence of a denial of federal constitutional power is therefore, in practical effect, a gap in the distribution of legislative
powers. This is certainly untrue as regards securities.
179
Kirkbi, supra, note 72, at paras. 29 and 31. Trade-marks Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-13.
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whole. This is especially so in a context where provinces have, for a long
time, been constitutionally endowed with power over the litigious matter.
In any case, the City National Leasing decision should be used prudently.180 It is worth recalling that this decision was concerned only with
a very limited issue: the constitutional validity of a private remedy established under the Combines Investigation Act.181 Similarly, in Kirkbi the
constitutional validity of a civil remedy was at issue; the parties did not
challenge the Trade-marks Act as a whole.182 In addition, contrary to securities, neither competition nor trade marks has ever been the subject of
full-fledged and systematic provincial regulation. The case for provincial
inefficiency was therefore made that much easier to argue.
From what has been established up to now, we can conclude the following: although Parliament is most certainly competent over the interprovincial and international aspects of the securities trade, for this power
to be extended to the intraprovincial dimensions of the latter, a rigorous
empirical demonstration of provincial inefficiency should be mandatory.
As we will see in the final section, avenues of solution do exist to
properly divide up power where concurrent authority is concerned.
(c) Efficiency and Subsidiarity183
Under the umbrella of the Maastricht Treaty a great number of concurrent powers are recognized to the European Union and its member
states. And so as to ensure that “decisions are taken as closely as possible
to the citizen”,184 paragraph 5(3) of Title I of the Consolidated version of
the Treaty on European Union185 provides:
Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its
exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if and insofar as the
180
The arguments in this paragraph are taken from Karazivan & Gaudreault-DesBiens, supra, note 156, at 13 and 17-19.
181
City National Leasing, supra, note 65, at 670: “The issue is not whether the Act as a
whole is rendered ultra vires because it reaches too far, but whether a particular provision is sufficiently integrated into the Act to sustain its constitutionality.” See Combines Investigation Act,
R.S.C. 1970, c. C-23.
182
Kirkbi, supra, note 72, at para. 19: “The constitutionality of the Trade-marks Act as a
whole is not challenged on this appeal.”
183
This section owes a great deal to Part IV(2) entitled “Concerns About the Court’s Methodology: A Look at the Principle of Subsidiarity” of Karazivan’s and Gaudreault-DesBiens’ article,
supra, note 156, at 29-32.
184
Preamble of the Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, at 83/16, online:
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:0013:0046:EN:PDF>.
185
Id., at 83/18.
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objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the
Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but
can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be
better achieved at Union level.

Interestingly, although subsidiarity can lead to recognition to the Union of greater latitude in the exercise of a concurrent power, as appears
from a reading of paragraph 5(3), it does not automatically endow the
Union with the entirety of the said power. Indeed, in conformity with the
principle of proportionality, the latter power will be granted “only if and
insofar as” the member states’ incapacity justifies it.186
The functional test established under paragraph 5(3) of the Treaty on
European Union bears a close resemblance to Dickson C.J.C.’s “provincial incapacity” criterion — with a twist, however. Whereas the Canadian
version allows for the mobilization of purely rhetorical and normative
arguments in the establishment of provincial incapacity, a much more
rigorous system for monitoring the application of the subsidiarity and
proportionality principles is provided in the Protocol (No. 2) on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality.187
First of all, before proposing European legislative acts, the European
Commission, it is said, “shall consult widely” (section 2) and such consultations “shall, where appropriate, take into account the regional and
local dimension of the action envisaged” (id.). Drafts of European legislative acts need to be forwarded to national Parliaments (section 4) and
must contain a detailed statement making it possible to appraise compliance with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality (section 5).
Finally, and most importantly for the purpose of our discussion, this last
provision specifies that “[t]he reasons for concluding that a Union objective can be better achieved at Union level shall be substantiated by
qualitative and, wherever possible, quantitative indicators.”188 Consequently, not only shall persuasive empirical evidence be necessary to
prove the Union’s claim, but the proportionality principle will also enjoin
that proof be made of the difficulty or impossibility of achieving voluntary collaboration between the member states.189 The “credibility of
cooperation” test establishes that, in situations where the need to act in
186
Paragraph 5(4), id., at 83/18, states that “[u]nder the principle of proportionality, the content and form of Union action shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the
Treaties.”
187
Id., at 83/206.
188
Emphasis added.
189
Karazivan & Gaudreault-DesBiens, supra, note 156, at 30.
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common has been established, centralization is not required when voluntary cooperation among Member States is credible.
The Supreme Court of Canada might therefore find some guidance in
the European approach just described, especially since it has twice referred, in the recent past, to the principle of subsidiarity, a principle it
defined as “the proposition [according to which] law-making and implementation are often best achieved at a level of government that is not
only effective, but also closest to the citizens affected and thus most responsive to their needs, to local distinctiveness, and to population
diversity”.190 The European approach certainly raises a number of difficulties. However, it provides a credible methodology to assess issues of
efficiency and to limit the reach of the central government’s power over
intraprovincial securities regulation. It also provides an answer to the
question of how the conflict between a valid federal securities legislation
and its valid provincial counterparts would be settled. Assuming that
GRT is found to provide Parliament with power to regulate all aspects of
the Canadian securities market, what of the fate of the provincial regulatory system now in place?
Under the double aspect doctrine, the constitutional validity of this
system could not be questioned. But could the central government go as
far as proposed by the Hockin Report191 and provide that, following a
transition period of two years’ duration after the adoption of a national
legislation, all provincial securities legislation would be repealed?
Favouring as it does192 the recourse to an “operational conflict”
rather than to an “occupied field” test to determine whether federal
paramountcy is engaged, the Supreme Court might be hesitant to pronounce provincial securities legislation inoperable. The end result would
be a deep and maybe complicated intertwinement of federal and provincial legislation.

190

114957 Canada Ltée (Spraytech, Société d’arrosage) v. Hudson (Town), [2001] S.C.J.
No. 42, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 241, at para. 3 (S.C.C.); see also Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 100,
at para. 45.
191
Supra, note 7, at 61-62.
192
Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 100, at paras. 70-75. At para. 70, Binnie J. remarked
that
the main difficulty consists in determining the degree of incompatibility needed to trigger
the application of the doctrine of federal paramountcy. The answer the courts give to this
question has become one of capital importance for the development of Canadian federalism. To interpret incompatibility broadly has the effect of expanding the powers of the
central government, whereas a narrower interpretation tends to give provincial governments more latitude.
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If, on the other hand, the methodological approach proposed here
were ever to be adopted, this conflict issue might be deflated. Once
credible demonstration has been made that federal intervention would
indeed guarantee greater efficiency in the securities market, it would fall
to reason that the continued application of provincial legislation “would
frustrate the purpose of the federal law”.193 However, the simple assertion of the existence of a conflict would not suffice to bring about a
conclusion of inoperability.

VI. CONCLUSION
The regulation of securities in a federal state is a complex question.
But then federalism is a complex system that acknowledges the intricate
nature of our modern lives. The avenues of solution described here all
emphasize the need to bestow a complementary jurisdiction upon both
the federal and provincial levels of government. They do so because incantatory assertions about the virtues of strict uniformity or radical
decentralization belie the empirical reality of the tightly woven nature of
the extraprovincial and intraprovincial facets of the securities sector.
The temptation will be great for the Supreme Court of Canada to
abide by the wishes of the proponents of uniformity. However, caution
should prevail. What for the present looks like a strictly economic question could easily transmute itself into an all-out identitary battle. If weak
arguments based on a flimsy test of provincial incapacity are resorted to
by the Supreme Court to justify federal encroachments upon the provincial power over securities, not only will the legitimacy of the federal
intervention be questioned, but so will the legitimacy of the Court itself.194 Indeed, one should never forget that considerations of efficiency
always bring the following question to the fore: efficient for whom? The
national or the local community?
The better solution might be to simply jettison GRT as the constitutional basis of federal intervention in securities matters. To guarantee a
complementary instead of a plenary role to Parliament in such matters,
one avenue, as I said before,195 would be to ground federal legislation in
the central government’s jurisdiction over extraprovincial commercial
193
Id., at para. 75 and Rothmans, Benson & Hedges Inc. v. Saskatchewan, [2005] S.C.J. 1,
[2005] 1 S.C.R. 188, at para. 14 (S.C.C.).
194
Karazivan & Gaudreault-DesBiens, supra, note 156, at 37-39.
195
See supra, notes 49 to 51 and accompanying text.
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matters and its jurisdiction over extraterritorial issues. In this way, Parliament could, for instance, contribute to the success of a passport system
that would allow a market participant to choose a primary jurisdiction of
his or her choice. As mentioned earlier, for this choice to be respected,
Parliament could, by means of a referential legislation scheme, ensure
that the selected regulatory regime would be applicable all over the country. These two heads of power, defined in more conceptual than
functional terms, have the undeniable advantage of not being based on
any notion of efficiency.
In a word, if this sheep is not to look like a ram, courts will have to
be as imaginative as the Little Prince.

